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HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED
IN PENNSYLVANIA: THE MENTAL HEALTH-
MENTAL RETARDATION ACT OF 1966
In 1676 in Pennsylvania, a certain Jan Vorelissen of Amesland
complained to the court that his son Erik was "bereft of his naturall
Senses and is turned quyt madd," and that the father was too poor
to maintain the son. It was therefore ordered that three or four
persons be hired "to build a little block-house at Amesland for to
put in the said madman."' Thus began civil commitment in Penn-
sylvania.
2
Initially, Pennsylvania was in the vanguard among the colonies
in attempting to deal with the problems created by people suffering
with mental illness. The "Poor Act of 1729" provided that the
mayor of Philadelphia, together with an alderman, could compel
any resident who brought into the city "old persons, infant, maimed,
lunatick or any vagabond or vagrant persons" who were likely to
become public charges, to supply sufficient money to send the
person so imported "back to whence he came." Following this
purely economic solution evolved more humanitarian considera-
tions. In response to a petition from Benjamin Franklin, the
Pennsylvania Assembly, in 1751, authorized the establishment of a
mental hospital.4 The Constitution of the Commonwealth in 1790
empowered the several courts to care for the persons and estates
of those who were non cornopos rnentis.5 The first legislation ap-
peared in 1836 with the passage of an act governing "Lunatics and
Habitual Drunkards."' The Act was primarily designed to prevent
the dissipation of the real and personal property of such persons,
rather than to provide for their institutionalization.
The first detailed rules for civil commitment were enacted in
18697 providing that:
[I] nsane persons may be placed in a hospital for the insane
by their legal guardians, or by their relatives or friends in
case they have no guardians, but never without the certifi-
cate of two or more reputable physicians, after a personal
examination, made within one week of the date thereof
8
1. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 42 (2d ed. 1949).
2. The term "civil commitment," as used in this Comment, refers to
all of the events involved in the process by which non-criminal individuals
enter, stay in, and leave a mental health facility.
3. 4 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 164 (1897).
4. DEUTSCH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 59.
5. PA. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1790).
6. Pa. Laws 1835-36, No. 589.
7. Pa. Laws 1869, No. 78.
8. Pa. Laws 1869, No. 78, § 1.
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That this language will sound familiar to anyone acquainted with
current mental health legislation is not surprising, for the law of
1869 contains the only substantive provisions relating to civil
commitment ever enacted in Pennsylvania in the 290 years since
the erection of the blockhouse in Amesland. Aside from periodic
amendment, the only important advancements in the law have
been codifications.9 All of the laws concerning mental health were
collected and codified under one title by the Mental Health Act of
1951.10 Its only purpose was to make it easier for the existing
laws to be further amended. Pennsylvania then, although among
the colonial innovators, would appear to have lagged seriously in
continuing to operate under only a codification of prior existing law
enacted and amended since 1836. In fact, the opposite is true.
When examined in retrospect, the wisdom and foresight of the
draftsmen of the 1869 Act was exceptional. Not only has their
product withstood the test of time, but it continued to serve this
state's commitment needs satisfactorily until the last decade. A
cardinal indication of its endurance is the astonishing paucity of
case law which has arisen under this legislation. Those cases
which have arisen almost exclusively involve criminal defendants
who have been acquitted by reason of insanity or sentenced and
later transferred to a mental institution. Quare then why there
was any need for new legislation.
The longevity and endurance of a particular piece of legislation
does not always indicate that it is currently meeting the needs of
the segment of society it purports to regulate. Such was true of
the Mental Health Act of 1951 and its predecessors. The modern
approach to mental illness is oriented to prevention, appropriate
treatment of those afflicted while allowing them to remain in the
community, and a concomitant minimization of hospitalization and
deemphasis on mere detention and custodial care." While the Men-
tal Health Act of 1951 contained some language that was treatment-
oriented, in net effect it scarcely went beyond insuring the removal
of mentally disabled persons from the community and their place-
ment in institutions for the protection and comfort of society.
There was a glaring need for a legal framework which would
allow these new concepts in the mental health field to function
and expand to the extent that they were capable of implementation.
Pennsylvania's ability to satisfactorily accommodate the prob-
lems of mental illness while operating under such a relatively
archaic legislative framework can be attributed to three factors:
9. The first codification occurred in 1923, when all references to "in-
sanity" and "lunatics" were deleted and replaced by "mental illness" and
"patients." Pa. Laws 1923, No. 998.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1071-1622 (1954).
11. GOVERNOR's ADVisoRy COMMITTEE FOR COMPREHENSIVE MENTAL
HEALTH PLANNING, COM. OF PA., THE COMPREHENsIV MENTAL HEALTH PLAN
126 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PLAN].
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the professional competence of the psychiatrists and administrators
of our mental health facilities; the responsible attitude and effort
of the courts; and the lack of complaint by either those persons
detained in our institutions or the general public.12 These factors
add up to a comfortable but dangerous aura of complacency. This
has not been an area where there exists agitation for reform or a
new legislative program that might generate introspection and
change. There has been no single "villain" to attack. However,
this is an area of law that annually affects great numbers of
people directly and many more indirectly. 3 In light of the new
concepts in the field of mental health, it becomes apparent that
the conscientiousness of the courts backed up by professional com-
petence and responsibility is at best a short-run solution. As one
commentator put it: "The 'villain' is the (medico-legal) process
itself and the scriptless players who are unable to extemporize
their lines.' 4  To have continued under the Mental Health Act of
1951 any longer would have been to ignore contemporary medical
thinking and legislative trends.
Accordingly, in the Third Special Session of 1966, the General
Assembly promulgated the new "Mental Health and Mental Re-
tardation Act of 1966,"'1 an act "relating to mental health and
revising and changing the laws relating thereto."' The 1966
12. Interview with Dr. William P. Camp, Commissioner of Mental
Health for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in Harrisburg, October 25,
1966 [hereinafter cited as Camp].
13. The Pennsylvania State Mental Health Program renders annual
services to approximately 120,000 persons, including:
64,000 persons in State mental hospitals;
21,500 persons in State operated outpatient clinics and centers;
28,000 persons in State subsidized clinics and centers;
7,486 persons in psychiatric beds in general hospitals.
DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, COM. OF PA., RECENT FACTS (Sept. 1, 1966). In-
directly affected are families and business associates of these persons.
These figures do not include those persons receiving care in private
hospitals, which render services to between 5,000 and 6,000 patients an-
nually. As of June 30, 1966, there were 910 resident patients in private
mental hospitals. Letter from Office of Program Research and Statistics
in the Pa. Dept. of Welfare to F. Murray Bryan, November 16, 1966, on file
in Dickinson School of Law Library.
14. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 424, 459 (1966).
15. S. B. No. 8, Third Spec. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (1966) (enacted
October 19, 1966; effective January 1, 1967) [hereinafter cited as Mental
Health Act of 1966]. The Act had not been published or assigned a number
as of the date of this writing.
The Mental Health Act of 1951 and all other acts and parts of acts
insofar as they are inconsistent with the new Act are repealed absolutely,
effective July 1, 1968. In the interim period between the effective date of
the new act (January 1, 1967) and July 1, 1968, the provisions of either act
may be utilized, according to whichever provides the most convenient or
least costly procedure. Mental Health Act of 1966, §§ 701, 702, 704.
16. Mental Health Act of 1966 (excerpt from the preamble) (Emphasis
added.) To ascribe the legislature's action wholly to the theoretical moti-
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Act is not remedial but preventive legislation-a rare example of
the law anticipating and circumscribing potential abuse rather than
correcting it after its occurrence. It represents and reflects a
coalition of medical and legal interests and attempts to create a
framework wherein these often conflicting interests can effectively
coexist.
Although the attorney is involved in most of the decision-mak-
ing processes which characterize our mode of life, he has been con-
spicuously inactive in the procedures for the identification and dis-
position of the mentally disabled. It is submitted that the attorney
can be the moving force in assuring the protection of the funda-
mental rights of prospective mental patients merely by becoming
involved. This Comment is written with the hope that it will
acquaint the practitioner with the 1966 Mental Health Act, and
point up some of the problems and areas for concern inherent in its
provisions. The purpose of this Comment is to compare the provi-
sions of the Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of 1966 with the
Mental Health Act of 1951 as they pertain to "civil commitment,"
i.e. voluntary and involuntary hospitalization of mentally disabled
persons other than those involved in criminal proceedings.' Refer-
ence will be had to three recent "model" statutes which represent
the most progressive legal attitudes in this area. In 1952, the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health formulated a Draft Act which
was intended to be a working model for states which were revising
their mental health legislation. 8 In 1964 Congress passed a model
vations described above would be inaccurate. In 1963 a federal grant-in-
aid program to support mental health planning made federal funds avail-
able, resulting in a comprehensive plan for Pennsylvania including recom-
mendations for legislative revision. At the same time the clamor of the
civil libertarians over the rights of criminal defendants reached its height,
leading to some concern for the rights of the mentally ill. Maniacal homi-
cides in Houston and Chicago resulting in the death of some forty persons,
together with the abduction of a young girl by a former mental patient
in Pennsylvania, combined to spur the Assembly to action.
17. The Mental Health Act of 1966, §§ 301-5, 505-12, provides for the
establishment and financing of a network of coordinated and integrated
mental health facilities throughout the Commonwealth. Although not
under consideration in this Comment, this network of facilities is crucial to
the success of the new act, as will be apparent when its various provisions
are analyzed. The central focus of the program is comprehensive care in
the community through a county mental health center or comparable
mental retardation facility. The county center is conceived as a cluster
of services for a particular geographical area, serving a population of 75,000
to 200,000 each. The center is designed for short term intensive treatment,
and must include inpatient, outpatient, partial hospitalization, emergency,
and consultation services. Each county in the state must establish such a
center, including a county administrator and staff.
18. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
A Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill (Public Health
Service Pub. No. 51, 1952) [hereinafter cited as Draft Act].
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statute for Washington, D. C. 1' New York also recently revised
its law, effective in 1965, as the result of an exhaustive study.
20
TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION
In the eighteenth century, madmen were locked up in
madhouses; in the nineteenth century, lunatics were sent to
asylums; in the twentieth century, the mentally ill receive
treatment in hospitals.
2 1
The terminology used in a mental health statute is important
for two reasons. First, the terms used and their connotations set
the tenor for the whole commitment process. Being found "in-
sane" and "committed" to an "institution" carries a different im-
pact than being "certified" as a person who is "mentally disabled"
and "admitted" to a "hospital." The statutory language chosen in-
fluences the language on administrative forms, the attitudes of pub-
lic officials, and the state of mind of the members of the com-
munity affected by the law. The 1966 Act shows improvement in
this respect. "Institution" has been replaced by "facility." Under
the 1951 Act, "care" was defined to mean among other things, re-
ception, detention, transfer, parole, discharge, custody, maintenance,
support, segregation, training, discipline, nursing, food, and cloth-
ing.22 These terms seem to refer to mere ministerial services re-
lated to the custody of the patient. The 1966 Act, on the other
hand, uses terms denoting an emphasis on services dealing with
the person's mental incapacity. The Act also recognizes and sep-
arates the areas of "care" according to the nature, duration, and
intensity of that care, and according to the procedure by which
the person was admitted to a facility. "Inpatient services" means
diagnosis, evaluation, classification, care, treatment, or rehabilita-
tion rendered to a mentally disabled person admitted or committed
to a facility for a continuous period of twenty-four hours or
longer. 23 "Outpatient services" includes the same services rendered
to a person not so admitted, and adds "counseling care" to the
list.24  Another significant addition is "aftercare"-services ren-
dered to a person after his release from a facility. "Aftercare" is
designed to assist such a person in establishing and maintaining
himelf as a member of society, and includes foster home place-
19. District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, D. C.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-351,-366 (Supp. IV, 1965).
20. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 70-88. The act resulted from a
study by the Bar of the City of New York and Cornell Law School. SPECIAL
COMM. To STUDY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES OF THE Ass'N oF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK WITH THE CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, MENTAL ILLNESS AND
DUE PROCESS (1962).
21. JONES, LUNACY, LAW, AND CONSCIENCE, 1744-1845, at ix (1955).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(1) (1954).
23. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 102.
24. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 102.
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ment, home visiting, and outpatient care. 25  The use of such
terminology goes a long way toward divorcing mental illness from
the social stigma, fear, and suspicion that has surrounded it in the
past. As progressive as the language is, however, it does not go
far enough. The basic term "commitment" is still carried over
from the common law. A better term would be "hospitalization,"
which is not only more euphemistic, but connotes a regimen of
treatment and recovery rather than merely being "put away."
Terminology is also important since difficulty arises, not from
the term itself, but from its definition. A basic problem in drafting
any legislation is the definition of the class of persons contemplated
by the statute. The provisions of a mental health statute neces-
sarily contemplate persons who are "mentally ill." But as stated
in the study leading to the revision of New York law, "Who is
mentally ill? Some say all of us. A few say none. We have no
pat answer."26 The problem lies in the diverse purposes of legal
and medical terms. A legal term has a precise meaning. It is a
term of art, used by the persons who make, enforce, and interpret
the law; and it aims at achieving certain social goals.2 7 Medical
terms describe diseases and disorders only in degrees, using generic
terms peculiar to the particular branch of medicine. The legal
meaning of "mental illness" does not necessarily coincide, however,
with the medical condition of the same name. The question,
then, is how to describe the mental disability of a person in such a
way as to bring it within recognized psychiatric classifications,
and also in such a way as to provide the legal criteria by which a
court can order the disposition of one who is mentally ill.
The 1951 Act defined mental illness as follows:
"Mental illness" shall mean an illness which so les-
sens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-
control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his af-
fairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advis-
able for him to be under care. The term shall include "in-
sanity," "unsoundness of mind," "lunacy," "mental dis-
ease," "mental disorder," and all other types of mental
cases, but the term shall not include "mental deficiency,"
"epilepsy," "inebriety," or "senility," unless mental illness
is superimposed.
28
A more vague or nebulous description of the condition under con-
sideration can hardly be imagined. Several questions are immedi-
ately raised. What of a person who has a congenital mental illness,
and therefore has no "customary" self-control which his disease
could be said to have "lessened?" What about adolescent children
25. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 102.
26. CORNELL STUDY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 17.
27. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
4 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(11) (1954).
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who have not yet reached a "customary" level of conduct, even
though they are seriously mentally ill? Which is to be given the
greater weight-"need or advisability of care," or the loss of "cus-
tomary self-control, judgment, and discretion?" The phrase "neces-
sary or advisable" is particularly ambiguous. The definition taken
as a whole served neither the psychiatrist nor the judge. There
were no medical terms which a psychiatrist could use to place the
person's mental condition within one of the currently accepted psy-
chiatric classifications, e.g., psychosis or neurosis. There were no
standards by which a judge could decide whether or not a person
should be involuntarily hospitalized. A more workable definition
was obviously necessary.
The 1966 Act defines this concept as follows:
"Mental disability" means any mental illness, mental
impairment, mental retardation, or mental deficiency which
so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-
control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his
affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or ad-
visable for him to be under care as provided in this act.
It shall include .... 29
That there is no appreciable difference in the new definition is
not due to a lack of effort on the part of the bill's draftsmen.
The original bill as submitted to the legislature would have reme-
died several of the defects previously noted in the 1951 Act.30 The
first draft provided "'Mental disability' means any mental illness
. .. personality disorder, psychoneurotic disorder, or any other
mental condition which so lessens. . ". ."31 This language was in-
corporated for two reasons. Psychiatrists or other physicians could
accurately describe the mental condition of the person in their re-
ports to (or testimony before) the court in precise and recognized
medical terms, and the court, having this terminology before it in
the statute, could easily correlate the medical testimony to the
statutory language.32 For once the doctors and the judges would
be speaking the same language.
The inclusion of the phrase "personality disorder" was also
crucial. Both drug addiction and alcoholism are properly desig-
nated as personality disorders.3 3 Since neither drug addicts nor
alcoholics are mentioned anywhere else in the 1966 Act, their in-
clusion under its provisions depends largely upon the use of this
phrase. Since the Act was intended to embrace alcoholics and drug
addicts, and "personality disorder" has been stricken from the
29. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 102.
30. S. B. No. 8, Third Spec. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly (Printer's No. 10,
1966).
31. S. B. No. 8, Third Spec. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 102 (Printer's
No. 12, 1966) (Emphasis added.)




definition, doctors and courts will now have to strain to bring
these persons under "mental impairment" or "mental deficiency.
'3 4
The original draft also omitted the word "his" from the phrase
"capacity of a person to use [his] customary self-control. .. .
The word was omitted because the definition was intended to
embrace the mentally retarded as well as the mentally ill. 6 Men-
tal retardation in the Act is defined as:
Subaverage general intellectual functioning which origi-
nates during the developmental period and is associated
with impairment of one or more of the following: (1)
maturation, (2) learning and (3) social adjustment.
3 7
A person who is mentally retarded therefore does not have "capa-
city to use customary self-control, judgment, discretion, etc." But
he does have the "capacity to use his customary control." When
the legislature put "his" back into that phrase in the final bill,
they took the mentally retarded out of the definition of mental
disability, and theoretically out from under the provisions of the
Act.
These problems, ironically, did not exist under the 1951 Act,
since it specifically defined and provided for "inebriates" (alco-
holics and drug addicts) and "mental defectives" (the mentally
retarded) .a8 Both of these classes of persons, to derive any benefit
from the 1966 Act, must be included in the definition of "mental
disability." It would appear that the Act should be amended to
restore the phrase "personality disorder, psychoneurotic disorder or
any other mental condition," and to delete the word "his" from
the definition of "mental disability."
Another drawback in both the old and new acts is that the
same definition of mental illness is used for all of the different
sections of the statute, although each of these areas is designed
to achieve a different result and is intended to apply to a different
class of persons. The same definition is used for both voluntary
admission to a facility and formal judicial commitment, when the
criteria for these two methods of hospitalization are vastly differ-
ent. It would appear that herein lies the difficulty in attempting
to formulate a workable definition of mental disability. The solu-
tion would be to arrive at a simple definition for Section 102
(Definitions) of the Act in such a form that it could be qualified
and expanded to meet the needs of each method of hospitalization
in its own section of the Act.
A possible approach would be that of the D. C. Act, which de-
fines mental illness to mean "any psychosis or other disease which
34. Ibid. Alcoholics currently account for 11% of all admissions.
35. S. B. No. 8, Third Spec. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 102 (Printer's
No. 12, 1966).
36. Camp, supra note 12.
37. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 102.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1072(7),(9) (1954).
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substantially impairs the mental health of an individual." 9 Obvi-
ously the imprecision of the term "mental illness" is not remedied
by defining it as the opposite of mental health. But the definition
is a sufficient and workable starting point. In the section pro-
viding for emergency hospitalization, the individual must be "men-
tally ill and, because of such illness, likely to injure himself or
others if he is not immediately detained .... ',40 This qualified
definition provides a standard by which it can be determined if the
person should be hospitalized on an emergency basis. The basic
definition, however, is not varied. The Draft Act, significantly,
does not even attempt to define mental illness. It does define a
mentally ill individual as "an individual having a psychiatric or
other disease which substantially impairs his mental health.
' 4 1
In its section on hospitalization via judicial procedure, the court
must find that the proposed patient:
(1) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, or
(3) is in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental
hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient in-
sight or capacity to make responsible decisions with
respect to his hospitalization. . . .42
It is suggested that the Pennsylvania Assembly give up the
task of trying to draw an all-inclusive definition of mental dis-
ability. The term should be defined in a general sense for ..Le
definition section. The nature, degree, and specific typ- -of dis-
ability should be spelled out in each of the ensuing provisions of
the act, to provide a workable standard for effective action under
that particular section. At the very least, the definition in the
1966 Act must be amended to bring drug addicts, alcoholics, and
the mentally retarded more clearly back within its scope.
VOLUNTARY ADMISSION
The term "voluntary admission" refers to procedures for ad-
mission to a mental facility which are commenced originally by the
affirmative action of the patient himself or of someone empowered
by law to act in the patient's behalf.4  With the modern advance
of psychiatry, the availability of effective treatment through the
use of tranquilizers, and a more enlightened understanding of
the problems of mental health by the public, there has been an
increasing emphasis on voluntary admission as the most desirable
method of hospitalization of the mentally disabled. This method
39. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-351(1) (Supp. IV, 1965).
40. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-355 (Supp. IV, 1965) (Emphasis added.)
41. Draft Act § 1(a).
42. Draft Act § 9(g) (Emphasis added.)
43, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Op. Cit. supra note 27, at 108,
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enjoys the unique position of being favored by all of the groups
concerned with influencing legislation in this field.4 4 The medical
profession endorses this procedure because of its simplicity and the
complete lack of any court action. 45 The patient who can recognize
his illness and seek hospitalization on his own volition is the one
who will actively participate in his treatment, cooperate with his
doctor, and benefit the most from the treatment. As a result the
voluntary patient will be discharged more rapidly, thereby allevi-
ating the generally crowded conditions that exist in most mental
facilities. Those who are concerned with civil liberties of mental
patients are reassured, since the dangers of wrongful detention
exist only in involuntary hospitalization procedures. Possibly the
most meritorious characteristic of this method is that the social
stigma of being mentally ill is all but erased. The patient enters
the hospital voluntarily and can leave at will, making the process
not unlike a normal hospital admission for a medical deficiency. 4'
Voluntary Admission Procedure
Under the 1951 Act, application for voluntary admission could
be made to the superintendent of any mental hospital by any per-
son, or in the interest of any person under twenty-one years of
age, thought to be mentally ill. 47 Every such application had to
be in writing, and signed in the presence of a witness. In the
case of a minor, his parent, guardian, or other person liable for his
support made application.48 The superintendent would then ex-
amine the applicant, and if he found that the applicant was men-
tally competent to make such application, and was in need of care
and would benefit from admission, he could ("may") admit him as
a patient.
49
That a person "thought to be mentally ill" was required to be
"mentally competent to make application" before being considered
for admission appears to be quite an anomaly. In 1947, however,
in Ex parte Romero, 50 the New Mexico court declared the volun-
tary admission statute of that state to be in violation of due process
for failure to provide notice and a hearing to the patient before
admission. The rationale of the court seemed to be that a mental
patient could not have the capacity to make application for hos-
pitalization. Similar reasoning may have produced the require-
ment of competency in the 1951 Act, but such an opinion is in-
44. Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N. C. L. REv. 274,
277 (1953).
45. Ibid.
46. For an excellent summary of the merits of the voluntary approach
see Draft Act, Commentary 19.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1161(a) (1954).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1161(b) (1954).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1162 (1954).
50. 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
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valid for two reasons. All mental patients are not so divorced
from reality as to be incapable of a rational act such as this appli-
cation. Further, although admission to a mental hospital may be
some evidence of incapacity, nowhere in the 1951 Act does it say
that admission or even commitment is an adjudication of incom-
petency.
If voluntary admission procedures are to be encouraged, the
provisions of the 1951 Act were not too conducive to their utiliza-
tion. Mental hospitals in Pennsylvania are not located so as to
conveniently serve most of the population. If a prospective mental
patient did not live near one of these hospitals, it was unlikely
that he would travel very far away from home to get to one. Fur-
ther, the requirement that the application be in writing and wit-
nessed created a formal atmosphere and connoted irrevocability, a
result completely inconsistent with the intended informality of this
procedure.
The language of the 1951 Act implied that the superintendent
alone was to examine the person and determine whether he was
in need of care. Since the admission was wholly at the discretion
of the superintendent, it might have been suggested that several
psychiatrists examine the person, so that a consensus of professional
opinion would be available to the superintendent.
The 1966 Act remedies several of its predecessor's shortcom-
ings. Any mentally disabled person who desires care in a facility
may make appropriate application directly to that facility, or to
the administrator of the county where the person is or resides.5 1
Application for voluntary admission for examination, treatment and
care may be made by any person over eighteen years of age, or
by a parent, guardian or individual standing in loco parentis to a
person eighteen years old or younger.52 The director of the fa-
cility shall cause an examination to be made, and if the person is
determined to be in need of care or observation, he may be ad-
mitted.5 3
Many of the objections to the old act in this respect have been
removed. A prospective applicant need only get to the county
administrator in the county where he happens to be. This is made
possible by the network of community service centers already men-
tioned. 64 The process is completely informal, with no writings or
witnesses. Under the 1951 Act, application for a minor had to be
made by a "person liable for (the patient's) support,"' implying
that admission was somehow conditioned upon ability to pay. The
new act gives no such hint, since public funds are readily ex-
51. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 401(a) (Emphasis added.)
52. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(a).
53. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(b) (Emphasis added.)
54. See note 17 supra.
55. PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1161(b) (1954).
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pended for this purpose if the person admitted or his parent cannot
pay.
50
The frivolous requirement that the person be mentally compe-
tent to make application has been omitted. But a question arises
as to why a person eighteen years old or younger could not apply
on his own, especially if he had no family or guardian. There is
also a possibility that the family of a teenager who really needed
treatment would refuse to make application for him out of fear of
resulting social stigma. The rationale for this requirement seems
to be the fear that a rebellious teenager, out of spite or retaliation,
might try to embarrass his family by running away and entering a
mental hospital.57 There is also the feeling that a child under
eighteen doesn't have enough judgment to realize the consequences
of his actions, and that he must be protected against himself.58 It
is submitted that when a teenager is mentally disabled he obvi-
ously would have impaired judgment, but that is no reason for
denying him access to treatment, especially if he is hampered by
a lack of understanding within his family. The rationale for this
restriction appears to be legislative rather than administrative, es-
pecially when it is noted that in the original draft submitted, the
age under which a parent had to apply was sixteen, rather than
eighteen.59 A valid suggestion might be that the act be amended
to lower the age limit for application pro se to sixteen, or in the
alternative to specify that the authorized agent of a governmental
or nonprofit health or welfare agency be permitted to apply in the
young person's behalf.
The 1966 Act also implies that a "team" examination of the
applicant will be made,60 thereby assuring that his acceptance or
refusal will turn on the fully informed judgment of the director.
Release
The 1951 Act provided that no person voluntarily admitted
could be detained for more than ten days after he had given written
notice to the superintendent of his intention or desire to leave the
institution.61 A patient under twenty-one could not be held for
more than ten days after the person who applied for his admission
had given written notice. Under no circumstances could a minor,
admitted voluntarily, be held for more than thirty days unless a
court order was obtained committing the person. The Department
of Welfare was put under a duty to inform the minor of his right to
release in the absence of a court order, and also of his rights
56. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 504(a).
57. Camp, supra note 12.
58. Ibid.
59. S. B. No. 8, Third Spec. Sess. Pa. Gen. Assembly § 402(a) (Printer's
No. 11, 1966).
60. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(b).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1164(a) (1954).
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with respect to a hearing before the court.62 In any case where
the superintendent found it inadvisable to discharge the patient,
he had to notify the patient's friends or relatives.
6 3
The right to prompt discharge upon recovery or request is
crucial to the success of voluntary admission. The 1951 Act was
less than desirable in this respect. If this method is truly "volun-
tary," why should the patient be required to remain for even ten
days? Moreover, the required written notice presupposes that writ-
ing materials are either available or supplied upon request. The
fact that the patient might be in some phase of treatment where
these materials would not be available is overlooked. Adequate
safeguards were provided for minor patients, but there is no
good reason why adult mental patients should not also be accorded
notice of their right of release.
This forced detention for a period after the giving of notice
was the issue in Ex parte Romero.64 The voluntary patient in
New Mexico had applied for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his
immediate release despite the existence of a statute requiring a
ten day period after written notice to the hospital. The respon-
dent's argument was that by voluntarily seeking admission the
patient had contracted to remain in the hospital for ten days subse-
quent to the submission of notice. The New Mexico court re-
jected this argument, holding that such a statutory procedure vio-
lated due process of law.6" It would seem that such a procedure
would be no less subject to constitutional attack in Pennsylvania.
The argument that a voluntary patient must be advised of the cor-
rect procedure for requesting release was rejected in the Connecti-
cut case of Roberts v. Paine.6 The patient sued for damages for
false imprisonment when he was detained for a period after orally
requesting release. The court held that there was no duty imposed
upon the hospital to inform the patient of the need of a written
request for release. The release procedure under voluntary admis-
sion should not be made to depend upon the patient's knowledge
of his statutory privileges. To adhere to such a requirement can
only deter the effectiveness of voluntary admission as the most de-
sirable hospitalization procedure.
It will be remembered that the 1951 Act required the superin-
tendent to inform the patient's relatives if he found it inadvisable
to discharge a voluntary patient. Did this mean that mere com-
pliance with the notice requirement was ipso facto authorization
for further detention? What if the relatives were glad to have
their burden off their hands and failed to protest? It would appear
that if this situation arose, the patient would have had to resort to
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1164(a.1) (Supp. 1965).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1164(b) (1954).
64. 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
65. Id. at 203, 181 P.2d at 813.
66. 124 Conn. 170, 199 Atl. 112 (1938).
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the time, trouble, and notoriety of a habeas corpus petition0 7 to
secure his release, even though he entered as a voluntary patient!
The new Mental Health Act purports to provide an effective
framework for voluntary admission. It recognizes that the pa-
tient's right to leave the facility at will is a necessary require-
ment. Many patients who would otherwise apply would be in-
hibited if they felt that there was a possibility they might be "cap-
tured."6 Except when the person admitted was eighteen or under
when admitted, and is still eighteen or under, any person volun-
tarily admitted shall be free to withdraw at any time.69 When the
person is still under eighteen, only his applicant or his successor
shall be free to withdraw the admitted person.70 Further, if the
patient is under eighteen, he must be informed at least every sixty
days of the voluntary nature of his status at the facility.71 Every
admission under this section must be reviewed at least annually
by a committee, appointed by the director from the professional
staff of the facility wherein the person is admitted, to determine
whether continued care is necessary. The committee must also
file written recommendations with the director of the facility, which
are open to inspection and review by the Department of Welfare.
72
Progressive though it is, this provision of the 1966 Act does not
go far enough. Any adult admittee can leave the facility at any
time without notice of any kind. A voluntary patient under eight-
een, however, depends for his liberty upon the affirmative act of
the person who applied in his behalf.73 What if this applicant does
not choose to remove him? Is this "voluntary" patient "stuck"?
It appears that a youthful patient was better off under the old
act, where under no circumstances could he be held for more than
thirty days after indicating a desire to leave, without a formal
judicial commitment. 74 It has been asserted that no problem ex-
ists, because if the applicant wouldn't withdraw the patient, the
director of the facility could discharge him, and if he wouldn't,
the Commissioner of Mental Health would, and if he wouldn't,
the Secretary of Welfare would, all by authority of section 420 of
the 1966 Act.75 This argument, however, presupposes that the
sympathies of the administrators are with the patient, and that
they want to see him released. The discharge provisions of section
420 would not alleviate the situation certain to occur when (1) the
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1241 (1954).
68. Interview with Dr. William P. Camp, Commissioner of Mental
Health for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in Harrisburg, October 25,
1966 [hereinafter cited as Camp].
69. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(c) (Emphasis added.)
70. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(c).
71. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(d).
72. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(d).
73. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
75. Camp, supra note 68.
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patient under eighteen desires release; (2) his applicant does not
choose to remove him; and (3) the director feels that he should
remain. The whole concept of voluntary admission hinges on the
ability of the patient to leave when he wants to go. To make re-
lease contingent upon the desires of anyone other than the patient
himself is contrary to the very spirit of the voluntary admission
scheme. The further argument was advanced that a patient un-
der eighteen should not be released when he desires because his
parent, the applicant, must know where his child is at all times.
76
The answer to that objection is simple. A phone call could be
made to the young patient's applicant, informing him that the per-
son has indicated a desire to leave, and that he will be detained
only as long as it takes the applicant to get to the facility to re-
ceive him. It is therefore suggested that the statute be amended to
allow the voluntary patient under eighteen the same freedom of
choice as is accorded his adult counterpart. The language as
it stands is a violation of due process, allowing deprivation of
liberty without judicial action.
A further paradox is the provision under the new act providing
that only those voluntary patients under eighteen be informed of
their voluntary status every sixty days. This is a totally empty
safeguard, since, as was noted above, they cannot get themselves
out even if they are aware of their status. On the other hand,
those voluntary patients who can withdraw at will, the adults, do
not have to be notified of their status at all. The argument was
advanced to the writer that, although periodic notice of status to
every voluntary patient was a desirable safeguard, such a re-
quirement would be a nuisance, and impose "too great an adminis-
trative burden. '77 Therefore a compromise was worked out under
which notice would be given to the young patients, since they are
the ones most likely to be "strongarmed" into the facility in the
first place.78 It is submitted that to deprive any voluntary mental
patient of continuous awareness of his status because of inconveni-
ence to hospital personnel cannot be justified on any ground. It
would take but the part-time attention of one clerical worker at
each facility to keep track of all of the voluntary patients and to
see that they were informed of their status every sixty days. To
provide such a person would not impose too great a financial bur-
den on the facility, and would go a long way toward a truly volun-
tary scheme of admission.
That each voluntary admission must be reviewed annually by
a committee composed of the professional staff of the facility is
another safeguard which appears desirable on its face. The meas-






The only difficulty is that such a committee cannot possibly be
anything but subjective in their determinations, when total objec-
tivity in such a review should be mandated. The principle is well
established that situations of conflicting interests cannot be en-
trusted to one single person or agency. To ask institutional psy-
chiatrists to occupy the dual role of medical benefactors and guard-
ians of the patient's civil liberties at the same time is too much.
There should be a reviewing agency for this type of admission,
but it should be an independent body composed of both psychia-
trists and attorneys, which could review the situation with the
desired objectivity. This concept will be expanded in another sec-
tion of this Comment. Also treated elsewhere in this paper are the
civil rights of voluntary patients while in the facility.
It is submitted that the scheme of voluntary admission is the
key solution to a large number of the problems in the field of men-
tal disability. Widespread utilization of this method should not be
hampered by too many inadequate statutory provisions; any and
all steps should be taken to ensure that the legislative framework
encourages the use of this procedure.
VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
When a statutory scheme for truly voluntary admission is an-
alyzed, it quickly becomes apparent that the free release proce-
dures that accompany this method can become disconcerting and
frustrating to the staff of the facility. They are constantly faced
with the dilemma of having to discharge a patient before his treat-
ment has been completed or even begun.79 The problem is espec-
ially acute in those cases in which a person applies for admission
during a lucid interval, and then expresses the desire to leave after
he passes into another stage of his illness, usually when his con-
dition becomes severe.80 The same problem occurs when drug ad-
dicts and alcoholics present themselves, in an inebriated condition,
and want to leave immediately after the effects have worn off.81
The 1966 Act disposed of this problem by providing a type of
procedure called "Voluntary Commitment.8 s2 This method pro-
vides for a compromise between the prospective patient who wants
to retain the advantages of a voluntary status and the reticent
psychiatrist who fears that the person would leave soon after treat-
ment had begun. The person makes a bargain or "contract" with
the facility, saying in effect that "If you will help me, I promise
to stay for at least ten days."' 3 During this period, at least some
79. Borden, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania, 33 TEMP.
L. Q. 165, 180 (1960).
80. Overholser, The Voluntary Admission Law, 3 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY
475, 479 (1924).
81. Camp, supra note 68.
82. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403.
83. Camp, supra note 68.
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diagnosis and prognosis can be made. Such a contractual arrange-
ment was declared constitutional in an Attorney General's opinion
in New York,8 4 but again in New Mexico such a provision was
found to be unenforceable.8 5
The language of the "voluntary commitment" section of the
Act follows closely that of the "voluntary admission" section, but
for the following distinctions. The application must be in writ-
ing and signed by the applicant in the presence of at least one wit-
ness.16 If the person is found to be in need of care he shall be
committed for a period not to exceed thirty days.8 7 Successive
applications for continued voluntary commitment may be made
for successive periods not to exceed thirty days each, so long as care
or observation is necessary.88  No person so committed shall be de-
tained for more than ten days after he has given written notice
of his desire to leave, or after the applicant or his successor has
given similar notice. 9 Provisions for review and notice are set
out exactly as in the "voluntary admission" section.90 It was
pointed out to the writer that there was a significant error in the
draft of the Act which was enactedY1 The commitment was not
intended to be limited to a thirty day period, nor were successive
applications for successive periods to be included. The same pro-
visions were amended out of the "voluntary admission" section, and
not amended out of the "voluntary commitment" section through
an oversight. It is assumed that an amendment to accomplish
this deletion will be forthcoming.
A possible problem is foreseeable in connection with the dual
system of voluntary "admission" and "commitment." The language
under the "admission" section indicates that the director "may"
admit the applicant, making acceptance by the facility discretion-
ary. 2  Corresponding language under the "commitment" section
says that the director "shall" commit the applicant, making accept-
ance mandatory if the person is also found to be in need of care.9 3
With the crowded conditions that prevail generally in mental facili-
ties, it is conceivable that "repeater" mental patients might auto-
matically begin to apply under the "commitment" procedure in
order to assure themselves of a place in a state facility. This, in
turn, would aggravate conditions in already crowded institutions.
Fortunately, such a problem is not likely to arise in Pennsylvania,
since there has been a steady drop in the number of residents of
84. N.Y. Ops. Arr'y GEN. 332 (1923).
85. Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 181 P.2d 811 (1947).
86. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403(b).
87. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403 (b).
88. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403(b).
89. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403(c).
90. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403(d).
91. Camp, supra note 68.
92. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 402(b).
93. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 403(b).
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mental facilities since 1955, and our institutions are not now grossly
overcrowded.
9 4
This new procedure therefore satisfies the objections that
have been raised under voluntary admission concerning improvi-
dent discharges. When persons present themselves at a facility
in such a manner as to cause the doctor to doubt the sincerity of
their application, the option of "voluntary commitment" can be of-
fered, and if accepted, the doctor can proceed with the knowledge
that his time and efforts are not going to be completely wasted.
With the purpose of this section in mind, no objection to the ten
day period of detention after notice can be validly lodged. But
the criticism offered above with respect to patients under eighteen,
notice, and provisions for review would still apply to the "volun-
tary commitment" section.
Ex PAmTE CoMMITMNr
A third method of hospitalizing the mentally disabled is ex
parte commitment, so-called because the process is initiated by per-
sons other than the prospective patient, with no notice to him and
no opportunity for him to protest. Thus a mere definition of
this procedure points up its shortcomings. This method is designed
to fill the gap between voluntary admission and formal judicial
commitment. The 1951 Act provides for such a procedure under
the title "Admission on Application of Relative . . .with Qualified
Physicians Certificate."95  Application for admission as a patient
could be made in the interest of any person who "appears to be
mentally ill or in such condition as to need the care required by
persons who are mentally ill," to the superintendent of any mental
hospital.9 8 Such application could be made by the patient's relative,
friend, legal guardian, or any other responsible person, or in the
absence of any of these, by the agent of a health or welfare or-
ganization.9 7 The application had to be written, accompanied by the
certificates of two qualified physicians, and sworn to or affirmed
before a person authorized to administer an oath in the Common-
wealth, who certified the genuineness of the signatures s8 In the
physicians' certificates, only such information as the Department
of Welfare required needed to be included. 9 Upon receipt of
the application and certificates, the superintendent could receive
and detain the person sought to be admitted. 100
94. Camp, supra note 68. At the end of fiscal year 1955, there were
40,920 patients actually residing in State mental hospitals. As of the end
of fiscal year 1965, the comparable figure was 35,958. [December, 1965]
PA. PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT 54.
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1181 (1954).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1181(a) (1) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1181(b) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1181(c),(d),(e) (1954).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1182 (Supp. 1965).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1181(f) (1954).
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Ex parte commitment has been justified on several grounds.
It is said that since most of these cases are uncontested, it is in-
convenient and costly to require a judicial hearing.10 1 Further,
that a hearing before a black-robed judge, with all of the trappings
of a trial, will confuse the disturbed patient who will feel that
society is conspiring against him.102 It is submitted, however, that
in theory this method of hospitalization is fraught with more dan-
ger of abuse and wrongful detention than any other to be discussed
in this Comment.
It will be noted that there is no requirement of a finding by
anyone that the person to be admitted is mentally ill. The diffi-
culties heretofore discussed in defining mental illness do not even
come into play, since the only requirement is that the person
appear to be mentally ill, or worse yet, be in such condition as to
need the care required by persons who are mentally ill. It is sug-
gested that in a complex, demanding, and neurotic society such
as ours, many perfectly sane people could appear to be mentally
ill at one time or another. An amnesiac would qualify. So would
a confused and senile elderly woman. A person who is medically
ill could also so appear.
Application can be made by "any responsible person," but there
are no standards for such a determination, nor does the statute
specify where or by whom such a determination of responsibility is
to be made. Any general practitioner can qualify to examine and
certify the person, even if he has had no psychiatric training.
The person's consent to such admission is not required, and he
need not be given notice of any kind. If he wanted to protest, he
could not, since there is no hearing or judicial review provided.
Possibly, the first time that the person would know of his immi-
nent hospitalization could be when the hospital attendants came
to take him to the facility. Once committed, there are no effective
release procedures available, and his only remedy is a habeas cor-
pus petition, assuming that the patient is aware of its existence.
If he is not, and there is no subsequent action on his part, the
hospitalization could last for the balance of the patient's natural
life. The complete lack of standards or legal safeguards in this
statutory procedure is almost inconceivable.
Despite this patent injustice, a court sitting in Pennsylvania
held that this procedure did not violate due process. In Hammon
v. Hill 10 3 the relator brought a writ of habeas corpus in which
he sought release from a mental institution to which he had been
committed upon the certification of two doctors for a period of
two years. The relator had not been given either notice of the
commitment proceedings or an opportunity to be heard thereon.
101. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and
Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945, 972 (1959).
102. Id. at 973.
103. 228 Fed. 999 (W.D Pa. 1915).
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The court held that since the patient had the right to seek a writ of
habeas corpus, due process was not violated. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court went so far as to compliment this method of "ad-
mission" as one which avoids the stigma and unpleasantness of
court proceedings. 04 That it does so is its legal defect. The
right to protest before admission must be distinguished sharply
from the right to protest only after admission. Courts in the Dis-
trict of Columbia 1' 5 and Missouri 0 6 have made that distinction,
and found that due process has been violated when there is no
provision for protest before admission. Their reasoning was that
the writ of habeas corpus cannot take the place of an original
hearing because that would deny to the patient the very type of
hearing, the insufficiency of which, is the basis for seeking a writ
of habeas corpus. This logic is borne out in that only one Penn-
sylvania case could be found in which a person "admitted" under
this section of the 1951 Act successfully gained release by means
of habeas corpus proceedings. 10 7
The corresponding section of the 1966 Act is entitled "Commit-
ment on Application . .,"0 which more aptly describes this pro-
cedure than to term it an "admission." A written application for
commitment to a facility may be made in the interest of any person
who appears to be mentally disabled and in need of care, by a
relative, friend, guardian, or executive officer or authorized agent
of a governmental or non-profit health or welfare organization, or
any responsible person. 109 The application must be accompanied
by the certificates of two physicians who have examined the per-
son whose commitment is sought, within one week of the date of
the certificates, and who have found that, in their opinion, such
person is mentally disabled and in need of care."0 In the case of
a mentally retarded person, the certificates shall be accompanied
by the report of a psychologist. 1 ' The director may receive the
person and detain him until discharge in accordance with the pro-
visions of this act, and when application is made by any person
other than a relative or guardian of the person, the director upon
receiving the person shall notify the appropriate relative or guard-
ian. 12 Every commitment under the section must be reviewed
annually by the same type of committee required under the "vol-
untary" sections.1 8
104. In re Rymon, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 111 A.2d 677 (1940).
105. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
106. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
107. Commonwealth ex rel. Baird v. Noyes, 83 Pa. D. & C. 311 (C.P.
Montg. Co. 1954).
108. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404.
109. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404(a) (Emphasis added.)
110. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404(b) (Emphasis added.)
111. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404(b).
112. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404(c).
113. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 404(d).
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It is readily seen that the draftsmen attempted to write sev-
eral safeguards into the new Act. The doctors must now affirma-
tively assert that the person is mentally disabled. If the courtesy
of notice of his imminent commitment is not given to the patient,
it is at least given to his relatives if they were not the ones who
committed him. That the director can only detain the person
"until discharge in accordance with the provisions of this act ' 11 4
is somewhat vague, but at least release procedures are mentioned.
The provision for annual review remains subject to the questions
heretofore raised in that respect. But the two most crucial civil
rights to which the patient is entitled are not accorded him.
There is no notice to him, and no hearing or any method by which
the person can test or protest the actions against him before he
is committed.
It is interesting to note that when a mentally retarded person
is to be committed, the report of a psychologist must also be among
the required documents. Yet one who is mentally ill is not af-
forded the opinion of a psychiatrist. An inquiry on this matter
brought the answer that extensive psychological testing is needed
to determine the degree of retardation of one considered to be
mentally retarded, and that these testing procedures are outside
the scope of the experience of the ordinary physician. 1 5 It is
possible that the rapidly developing and highly sophisticated art
of psychiatry might also be outside of that scope, unless the doctor
involved is a very recent graduate of medical school. 116 Many
doctors, especially the older practitioners who attended medical
school when little or no psychiatric training was given, have had
no training or experience in the detection or care of mental illness.
It hardly seems reasonable to invest these men with the power to
deprive a person of his liberty because of a determination which
they might make in good faith, but for which they have little
114. Mental Health Act of 1966, §§ 418, 420, 426. Section 418 provides
that a person may be detained until care or treatment is no longer neces-
sary. Section 420 allows the Secretary of Welfare to order the discharge
of any person who no longer needs care or treatment. Section 426 provides
for habeas corpus and discharge by order of court.
115. Camp, supra note 68.
116. While physicians are better qualified to testify to a diseased
condition than are laymen, their testimony upon the subject of the
mental capacity of an individual whom they have . . .observed is
not entitled to any greater weight than that of a layman.
Tyler v. Tyler, 401 Ill. 435, 438, 82 N.E.2d 346, 349 (1948).
The courts . . .assume that any physician is competent to testify
on any topic in the field of medicine. This is certainly unrealistic,
especially with regard to psychiatry, in view of the wholly inade-
quate training in psychiatry which until very recently was given
to medical students, and the general lack of interest of the medical
profession in the subject of mental disorder.





Since the great majority of commitments to mental health
facilities in Pennsylvania have been and will continue to be ef-
fected via ex parte commitment, l" 8 revision of this section of the
Act to solidify its constitutional basis is strongly recommended.
Particularly good statutory provisions have been enacted in New
York and the District of Columbia. Under New York law, when
certificates of two physicians and the application of a relative are
received, the director must secure a second examination by a staff
physician of the facility to which the person is brought. The staff
physician cannot also be one of the original certifying physicians." 9
If admitted, the patient must be given notice within five days, and
at the same time notice must be given to the nearest relative and
any three other persons that the patient designates. 120 If within
the first sixty days of the admission anyone involved requests a
hearing, a hearing must be held in whichever county the person
requesting desires.' 21 The court must then hold a hearing, and if
it is determined that the person is mentally ill, an order for care
and treatment is made, for a period not to exceed six months.
12 2
All of the necessary and desirable safeguards are thus provided.
The District of Columbia Act goes even farther. The applicant
must take the prospective patient to the admitting psychiatrist
of any mental hospital for examination. The person will be ad-
mitted only if there is a need for treatment and the individual
signs a statement asserting that he does not object to his hospitali-
zation. Such statement must also include a recital of the right to
release of the patient in simple language. 23 Any person hospital-
ized under that section must be immediately released upon written
request unless proceedings for hospitalization pursuant to court
order have been started.' 2 4 Either of these statutes would serve as
an excellent model for revision of the 1966 Act, thus securing the
safeguards of due process of law to the individuals to be committed
117. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 668,
680 (1959).
118. During the 1964-65 fiscal year, there were 11,000 admissions to
Pennsylvania State Mental Hospitals. They were distributed by type of
commitment as follows:
Commitment Number Per cent
Voluntary 1156 10
Ex parte 7319 67
Emergency 1258 11
Court 1267 12
Letter from Office of Program Research and Statistics in the Pa. Dept. of
Welfare to F. Murray Bryan, November 16, 1966, on file in Dickinson School
of Law Library.
119. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 72(1).
120. N.Y. MENTAL HYciENE LAW § 72(2).
121. N.Y. MENTAL HYGrENE LAW § 72(3).
122. N.Y. MENTAL HYGI.NE LAW § 72(3).
123. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-354(a) (Supp. IV, 1965).
124. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-354(b) (Supp. IV, 1965).
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under ex parte procedures.
COMMITMENT FOR EMERGENCY DETENTION
Under the 1951 Act, application for admission as a patient for
temporary care could be made to the superintendent of any mental
hospital in the interest of any person who was or was thought to be
mentally ill. 125 The application, in writing, could be made by a
relative, guardian, or friend of the person, or in their absence, by
the officer or agent of a health or welfare organization. It had
to be accompanied by the certificate of one physician stating that
immediate temporary care in a mental hospital was necessary for
that person. In an emergency, the certificate could be supplied
within twenty-four hours of the admission.1 26 Upon receipt of
these documents, the superintendent could detain the person for
temporary care for not more than a twenty-one day period.127 The
person was to be examined during that period and discharged
if found not to need care. If the person was found to be in need
of care, the superintendent could admit him on a voluntary appli-
cation, notify the applicant to apply for the patient's commit-
ment, or begin proceedings for judicial commitment. 2
This procedure may have served a worthwhile purpose from a
medical standpoint, in that it could be invoked at that stage of a
person's illness when diagnosis and intensive short-term treatment
would be at the optimum time for recovery from or prevention of
mental illness.1 29 Since it is also an ex parte commitment, it is
subject to the same criticism as are other such commitments under
another name. There are no provisions for notice, no pre-hospital-
ization opportunity for objection, and inadequate release proce-
dures. Indeed the only distinction that can be drawn between this
method and "admission on application of relative, etc." is that the
latter results in hospitalization for an indeterminite period and the
former is for a specified period. In effect it was a twenty-one day
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
The title of this section of the 1951 Act indicated that it was
for "temporary or emergency detention."" 0  Emergency detention
implies an emergency situation, yet the language of the section did
not specify what type of emergencies were contemplated or how
these provisions were applicable to them. True emergencies were
covered by sections 316 and 317 of the 1951 Act, which related to
the disposition of violent or dangerous persons. These provisions
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184(a) (1954).
126. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184(b) (1954).
127. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184(c) (1954).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1185 (1954).
129. Borden, Hospitalizing the Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania, 33 TEMP.
L. Q. 165, 186 (1960).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1184 (1954) (Emphasis added.)
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were repealed, however, in 1952,131 leaving grave problems for
both police and mental health authorities. When a police officer
was confronted with a person who was violently mentally ill, he
often hesitated to act. Since the police power of the state only au-
thorizes summary detention where there is danger to persons or
property, the only way that the officer could get such a person
into custody was to stand there and wait for him to commit or
attempt a crime. The mere "threat" of danger to others, mani-
fested only by the words of a bystander, would not give probable
cause to make an arrest. Once a criminal act occurred the police-
man could arrest him. If no crime was committed or attempted,
the officer who detained such a person had a heavy burden thrust
upon him if the legality of the detention was challenged. These
situations arose when the dangerous person was at large, but
greater problems existed when a mentally ill person went berserk
in a private home. The officer then had to secure a warrant.
132
A mentally ill person can be dangerous, however, without show-
ing any signs of violence, 13 3 and the common law justification for
his detention falls. These problems were magnified when a police
officer was not available. If the agent of a health or welfare or-
ganization was summoned, he had even less authority than a police-
man to take the person into custody. The end result was that
everyone stood around until the person who was mentally ill either
hurt himself, or another person, or committed a crime, and then
he was arrested and put into jail, which is the last place mental
patients should be detained.
The 1966 Act has provided a well drafted procedure for emer-
gency detention which allows a specified class of persons to take
the mentally ill person into custody and protects his civil rights as
well. Whenever a person appears, by reason of his acts or threat-
ened acts, to be so mentally disabled as to be dangerous to himself
or others and in need of immediate care, he may be taken into
custody for the purpose of examination, provided that: (1) Only a
relative, guardian, friend, individual standing in loco parentis to
the person, an executive officer or authorized agent of a govern-
mental or recognized non-profit agency providing health or wel-
fare services, or a police officer may take such person into custody,
and then only upon written application approved by the (county)
administrator or his delegate; and (2) the acts or threats which
give cause to believe the person to be mentally disabled and in
need of immediate care are overt, demonstrate a clear and present
danger to self or others and are set forth in the application.
3 4
Immediately upon being taken into custody, the person must be
taken to a physician or designated facility for examination on an
131. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1186, 1187 (1954).
132. Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
133. Camp, supra note 68.
134. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(a) (Emphasis added.)
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emergency basis. If the physician determines that the person is
in need of immediate emergency care, local or state police shall
forthwith transport such person to the designated facility to be
committed for emergency care. 135 Another examination is re-
quired at the facility, and immediately upon reception of the per-
son, the director must notify the appropriate relative or guardian
if they were not the ones who made application. 13 6 If the examin-
ing physician shall determine that any person taken into custody
by a police officer is not in need of emergency care, and the per-
son in custody has not also committed a criminal act, he shall be
returned immediately to the place where he was taken into custody
and released.137 None of the persons who proceed under this pro-
vision shall be held civilly or criminally liable therefore, unless he
acted maliciously and did not have probable cause to believe that
the person taken into custody was suffering from mental dis-
ability. 13 8 A person committed under this section may be detained
for ten days only. If the director during this period finds that
further care is required, he may admit the person on a voluntary
commitment or notify an appropriate person for application in his
behalf."
39
This section of the Act specifically and comprehensively covers
the hospitalization of violent and dangerous persons who appear to
be mentally disabled. The shackles have been removed from the
police and welfare workers who are most likely to be the ones to
confront such a person. They can initiate the procedure with the
knowledge that only malice and a lack of probable cause will render
them liable for their actions. Both the person who detains and the
detained have the additional safeguard of three separate reviews,
those of the county administrator, the examining physician, and
the admitting physician. It is unlikely that anyone could be wrong-
fully detained after passing the judgment of three such men.
It should be noted that the emergency procedure could not
work at all without the existence of twenty-four hour facilities in
every county in the state. With this network, no person should
ever have to be incarcerated, even for a short time. An immediate
examination is available, rather than "sometime" within twenty-
one days; and if there is a determination that emergency care is
not needed, the person can be restored to his prior environment
within a matter of hours after he has been taken into custody.
If care is required, the appropriate persons are notified at once.
It is suggested that two additional provisions would perfect
this section. The procedure is designed to remove any stigma of
criminality by making sure that the person detained cannot be put
135. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(b).
136. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(c).
137. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(d) (Emphasis added.)
138. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(e).
139. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 405(f).
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into jail, yet requires local or state police to transport the person
to the facility. Sufficient appropriations should be made to each
county facility allowing them to purchase an ambulance or other
suitable vehicle for use in these situations, or indeed in any situa-
tion where a mental patient must be transported. The use of
police vehicles should be discouraged in all but extreme circum-
stances. Secondly, it should be provided that after the initial ten
day period of permissible detention, if no other hospitalization pro-
ceedings have been initiated, the person should be promptly dis-
charged. In most situations such proceedings will have been begun,
but a director must not be arbitrarily allowed to hold a patient
until someone decides to make application. A detention period is
only a means of control over an immediate threat, and when that
threat subsides, there is no valid basis for detaining the person
further, even if he is mentally disabled. So amended, this section
would be the most salutary procedure provided under the Act,
from the standpoint of legal safeguards.
JUDICIAL COMMITMENT
Justification for forced admission to a mental hospital is most
validly based upon the police power of the state. Under this pow-
er, the state can protect the persons and property of its citizens by
restraining anyone who harms or threatens to harm either of these
interests. Unquestionably the state can incarcerate any person not
mentally ill who has injured another person or his property by
some violent act. The act has been completed, and the determina-
tion of guilt and subsequent incarceration occur after the fact.
To protect society from further injury and to deter future offenses,
imprisonment for periods up to life are easily justified. However,
when using the police power to deprive a mentally ill person of
his liberty, there arise several problems of application. The ques-
tion then becomes whether or not this potential patient is dangerous
and likely to injure himself or others. To provide the answer, the
determining agency, in this case the psychiatrist and court, are
required to predict the future conduct of the person, and to base
his admission to a mental hospital only on the potential threat
involved. This is quite a different determination than that which
occurs after a crime has already been committed. It would seem
to require that every constitutional safeguard should be granted
the person whose freedom depends upon such an uncertainty, es-
pecially when the determination is made under judicial sanction
(as opposed to ex parte commitment).
The state also justifies forced hospitalization of mental pa-
tients under the theory of parens patriae. This doctrine imposes
a duty upon the state to protect the persons and property of its
citizens because of their minority or mental incapacity. In the
case of persons thought to be mentally ill, the criterion is their
benefit from institutional care and treatment. Therefore they are
COMMENTS
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committed because such a course of action is "good for them" or
because they supposedly lack the mental capacity to make a ra-
tional decision with respect to their hospitalization.
Both doctrinal bases of compulsory commitment find expres-
sion in the Draft Act, where judicial commitment for an indeter-
minate period can be ordered only if it is found that the proposed
patient:
(1) is mentally ill, and
(2) because of his illness is likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, or
(3) is in need of custody, care, or treatment in a mental
hospital and, because of his illness, lacks sufficient in-
sight or capacity to make responsible decisions with re-
spect to his hospitalization.1
40
The 1951 Act provided that a petition could be presented to the
court of the county where the patient was or resided for the com-
mitment of any person who was mentally ill to a mental hospital,
or if "thought to be mentally ill," for observation, diagnosis, and
treatment in a mental hospital.141 rt is interesting to note that
the person is labelled a "patient" even while the petition is being
submitted. Such a petition had to be sworn to or affirmed, and if
the person was mentally ill, it could be presented by any respon-
sible person. 142 It is unclear how the petitioner was to tell if the
person "was" mentally ill. If the person was only thought to be
mentally ill, the petition could be presented by his guardian, rela-
tive, or friend.143 The petition had to be accompanied by the sworn
certificates of two physicians, which had to have been executed
within two weeks prior to presentation of the petition.144 Upon
presentation of the petition, the court, in its discretion, "may" ap-
point a commission to inquire into and report upon the facts in
the case. 145 Under certain circumstances "may" is construed to
mean "shall," and it might be argued that the appointment of a
commission may have been mandatory. There is evidence that the
legislature intended the plain meaning of the word, however, since
in the comparable section that applied to criminal commitments,
the word "shall" was employed, thereby making the commission
mandatory in that situation.146 The language was passed upon by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Ballem.
47
While recognizing that the appointment of a commission is not
mandatory, the court felt that there was no right to arbitrarily or
140. Draft Act § 9(g).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1201(a) (1954).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1201(b)(1) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1201(b)(2) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1201(d),(e) 1954).
145. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1202(a) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
146. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1225 (1954).
147. 386 Pa. 20, 123 A.2d 728 (1956).
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capriciously refuse to appoint a commission.
Ballem, however, was a criminal proceeding, not civil commit-
ment, and the pronouncement assumes that there is someone ob-
jecting to a refusal of the commission. In civil commitment nei-
ther the proposed patient nor his representative need appear be-
fore the court, if indeed there is a hearing at all. The appointment
of a commission in civil commitment was therefore completely at
the court's discretion.
Such a commission, if appointed, was to be composed of three
persons, two physicians and an attorney.148 The commission heard
such evidence as was offered, or they requested. If the person
to be committed refused to submit to an examination before them,
they could compel his submission by petitioning the court to issue
a warrant.149 The commission then made a report to the court
stating whether or not the person was mentally ill "and a proper
subject for commitment to a hospital.' 150 When the court re-
ceived either a petition for commitment, or the report of the com-
mission "if one had been appointed," it was optional with the court
to fix a date for a hearing. If a hearing was held, the court had to
notify the parties in interest, could require the presence of the
person to be committed, and could exclude the public. If the court
approved the commission's report that the person was mentally
ill and "a proper subject for care," or that the safety and welfare
of the public required such commitment, an order for commitment
to an institution could be made. The order authorized the super-
intendent to detain the patient until removed in accordance with
the provisions of the Act.' 5' When the court committed a person
"thought to be" mentally ill, for observation and diagnosis, the
commitment was for a definite period not to exceed ninety days.
Within that period the superintendent reported to the court and,
if the court was satisfied that the person was not mentally ill, he
was discharged. Otherwise, the court could make such order for
his further disposition as may have seemed proper.
152
Examination of the 1951 Act yields two apparent bases for
commitment by judicial order. The person must either be men-
tally ill and a "proper subject for care," or so mentally ill that the
"safety and welfare of the public require" his commitment. The
latter standard is probably justifiable even though, as previously
noted, it is based upon a prediction of future conduct. But the
validity of a standard that allows a person who is a "proper subject
for care" to be forcibly hospitalized is open to serious question.
At a time when the civil liberties movement is gaining strength,
and courts are overthrowing precedent to guarantee criminal de-
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1202(b) (1954).
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1202(c) (1954).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1202(d) (1954).
151. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1203 (1954).
152. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1206 (1954).
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fendants their constitutional rights, it would seem that more con-
cern would be exhibited in connection with judicial commitment of
the mentally ill. Yet all of the actors in the process seem com-
pletely passive. It is pointed out that since relatively few cases of
involuntary hospitalization are effected by judicial commitment,
the procedure has not aroused general concern.l s The argument
is heard that since the person to be committed does not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself on the question of hospital-
ization, the court is only substituted to make the decision for him.
Somehow the general attitude has come to be that the whole pro-
cedure is unobjectionable since, after all, hospitalization is "good
for" such a person. Recently a court even denied that involuntary
hospitalization is a deprivation of liberty "as within the meaning of
the constitutional provision that 'no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.' ",154 By such
reasoning, we allow a person to be committed to a mental institu-
tion by order of court without requiring that he be given notice of
the proceeding, without requiring that any hearing be held, with-
out requiring his presence if there is a hearing, without giving him
the right to have counsel, and based upon the pure discretion of a
judge who only has to find that the person is a "proper subject for
care." Further, we allow the whole procedure to be conducted be-
hind closed doors, and justify the process on the ground that a
mentally disabled person should not have to suffer such "indig-
nities."
This justification is based upon the premise that the person to
be committed is not heard to object, and if allowed to choose for
himself, would choose hospitalization. It is submitted that in al-
most every instance of judicial commitment, the person to be com-
mitted is objecting. If he were not protesting, the issue would not
be in court, since "voluntary admission" and "commitment on the
application of a relative" are available for the commitment of a
non-objecting person. Viewed in this light, judicial commitment is
a very real deprivation of liberty, and should be afforded all of
the constitutional guarantees of due process of law.
Another unwarranted assumption is that such hospitalization
is beneficial to a "proper subject for care," and that if he was
capable of choosing, such a person would admit himself. That
would be true if psychiatric knowledge and methods of treatment
had progressed to the point where there was a probability that a
mental patient would be "cured." It would also be correct if
mental facilities were adequately staffed and all mental patients
were in fact being actively and effectively treated. It would also
153. Interview with Dr. William P. Camp, Commissioner of Mental
Health for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in Harrisburg, October 25,
1966 [hereinafter cited as Camp].




be true if every person committed to a mental hospital were even
given and guaranteed the right to treatment. But it is very un-
likely that these three conditions would exist simultaneously, if
at all. A mental illness is not "cured" in the same sense that a
broken leg heals. There is no certainty connected with the treat-
ment process that could be analogized to the probability that a
person with a diseased appendix will be restored to health if it is
removed. Secondly, although there are notable exceptions, most
mental hospitals are largely custodial institutions which have a
ratio of doctors to patients so low that effective individual psycho-
therapy is all but impossible. One observer wrote, in 1962:
According to a recent survey, eighty per cent of mental
institutions are purely custodial, providing no treatment of
any significance even to their law-abiding patients ...
A good portion of the remaining twenty per cent provide
adequate treatment only for well-paying private patients.
155
A Senate committee was told in 1961 that half the patients in
state hospitals receive no treatment at all and that "in most public
mental hospitals the average ward patient comes into person-to-
person contact with a physician about fifteen minutes every month
"156
Finally, nowhere in the Act is the right to treatment specified.
If a person with a diseased gall bladder knew that there was only a
remote possibility that its removal would relieve his condition,
and that if admitted to a hospital he would see a doctor for only
fifteen minutes a month, and that admission to the hospital was no
guarantee of treatment-would he choose to go to the hospital?
It is suggested that a person thought to be mentally ill might not
choose to go either. Therefore the rationale that the court is only
"choosing" for the incapacitated person is without merit, especially
when this "choice" is forced upon a person who objects.
Tt is altogether laudable to attempt to shield a potential men-
tal patient from the indignity, publicity, and trauma that might
accompany a public hearing. It is submitted, however, that if
the person to be committed or any other person lodges an objec-
tion, the situation calls for a full-blown adversary proceeding with
all of the constitutional guarantees of a trial. Only in this way
can the fear of wrongful commitment be erased from the minds of
the public. It is recommended that notice of the petition be given
to the person to be committed. If his condition is sufficiently
stable to allow him to protest, service of notice should not be too
damaging to him. The person should be given the right to counsel,
and counsel should be appointed if the person is indigent. There
155. Schmideberg, The Promise of Psychiatry: Hopes and Disillusion-
ment, 57 Nw. L. REV. 20, 22 (1962).
156. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the.
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, pt. 1, 43-4, at 103 (1961).
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should be a public hearing where the prosecutor can state his case
and provide an opportunity for it to be challenged. The psychia-
trist's role should be that of an expert witness only, since the ulti-
mate question is two-fold: (1) Is the person mentally ill? (2) If so,
should he be committed? The first question is a medical one, to
which the psychiatrist is competent to testify; but the second ques-
tion is a social value judgment, and is a question for the court.
It must be remembered that the situation where there is danger to
others is not here under consideration. The safeguards being ad-
vocated should apply only when the judicial process is being sub-
stituted as a decision-maker for the supposedly incapacitated per-
son, the justification being that he is "in need of care," and when
someone has raised an objection.
The 1966 Act has brought several changes in its section "Civil
Court Commitment.' 157 Whenever a person is believed to be men-
tally disabled and in need of care or treatment by reason of such
mental disability, and examination of such person has been made
by a physician, or for any reason the examination of such person
cannot be made, a petition may be presented in a court of common
pleas for his immediate examination or commitment to an appro-
priate facility for examination, observation, and diagnosis. The
usual class of persons may bring the petition, which shall set forth
the facts upon which the petitioner bases his belief of disability
and the efforts made to secure examination of the person by a
physician. 158 Unlike the language of the 1951 Act, the new Act
implicitly recognizes that the person is objecting, by requiring that
the efforts previously made to have him examined (presumably
rebuffed) be set forth in the petition. The court shall then (1)
issue a warrant requiring that said person be brought before the
court; (2) fix a date for a hearing which shall be as soon as the
warrant is executed; and (3) notify the parties in interest.159 Two
of the events advocated above are thus provided. There is a hear-
ing, and the patient is given notice, however abrupt notice given
by the service of a warrant may be. After the hearing, the court
may order an immediate examination by two physicians, or order
commitment to a facility for not more than ten days for the pur-
pose of examination. If the examination can be accomplished by
partial hospitalization, the court may so direct. 16 0 It is noted that
an element of speed is implied, and that total deprivation of lib-
erty is to be avoided where possible, even for the period of time
required for examination. If, upon examination, it is determined
that such person is in need of care at a facility, an immediate re-
port is made to the court, which may order commitment. In the
order of commitment, the court may permit partial hospitalization
157. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 406.
158. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 406(a) (1),(2).
159. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 406(a) (3).
160. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 406(a) (4).
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or outpatient care, or if at any time thereafter the director shall
determine partial or outpatient care to be beneficial, the same
may be permitted by the court.' 61 These desirable options available
to the judge are a result of the network of county centers already
described, which make treatment short of full hospitalization pos-
sible in geographical areas where it was usually impossible until
now.
Although the new Act has improved the procedure immensely,
there is still no mention of a right to counsel or jury trial, which
leaves civil commitment in Pennsylvania still subject to criticism.
The hearing provided comes at the wrong place in the sequence.
Instead of a hearing after it is found that there is a need for care,
in order to determine the social question of whether to commit
the person, the hearing is held before the examination. Another
notable omission is that a finding that the person is mentally dis-
abled is not required at all-only that he is in need of care at a
facility. If the standard of mental illness plus need of or benefit
from care was suspect, it becomes moreso when the finding of
mental disability is not even required. Nowhere does the Act men-
tion that danger to others or self is required; therefore, it may be
assumed that the only standard left is "need-benefit." Thus the
court is still allowed to choose the correct course of action for a
person thought not to have the mental capacity to choose for him-
self, without so much as a finding that he cannot make a rational
choice. Furthermore, once the choice is made for him, there is no
guarantee of treatment.
Notice should be taken of the exemplary statutory provisions
recently enacted in the District of Columbia. For hospitalization
under court order, the D. C. Code provides that the person be both
mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others if allowed to
remain at liberty.162 Pennsylvania requires neither. When a peti-
tion is presented to the court, notice is sent by registered mail to
the individual with respect to whom it was filed.163 Pennsylvania
sends a sheriff with a warrant for the person's arrest. There is a
hearing before a mental health commission which "shall be con-
ducted in as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly
procedure and in a physical setting not likely to have a harmful
effect on the individual named in the petition.1 164 The individual
is entitled in his own discretion, to be present at such hearing, to
testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses. The allegedly
mentally ill person must be represented by counsel in any pro-
ceeding before the commission or the court, and if he fails or re-
fuses to obtain counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent
161. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 406(b).
162. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(f) (Supp. IV, 1965).
163. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(b) (Supp. IV, 1965).
164. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(c) (Supp. IV, 1965).
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him.16 5 Pennsylvania only requires that the person "be brought
before the court." If the commission reports to the court that both
criteria for compulsory commitment are satisfied, the court must
duly notify the individual (who has been at liberty except when
appearing before the commission) that he has a five-day period
within which he or anyone in his behalf may demand a jury
trial. 166 Whether a jury is requested or not, there is a second
hearing, and if there is a jury, their finding is binding upon the
judge, who must release or hospitalize the individual accord-
ingly.
167
If hospitalized, the District of Columbia statute spells out the
patient's right to treatment:
Any person hospitalized in a public hospital for a
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled
to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The ad-
ministrator . . . shall keep records detailing all such care
and treatment . . . and such records shall be made avail-
able ... to (the person's) attorney or personal physician. 6
The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry has also urged that
"provisions that safeguard the patient's right to good treatment as
opposed to simple custody" are an essential element of commit-
ment laws.169
Since treatment of the illness (need - benefit) is the only basis
for formal judicial commitment in Pennsylvania, the right to treat-
ment would appear to be the rational conditio sine qua non for
such forced hospitalization. If we deny the individual basic safe-
guards in the pre-hospitalization procedure, the injustice is com-
pounded if the right to treatment is not guaranteed once he has
been committed. An inquiry as to why it was not mentioned
brought an answer that the draftsmen wanted to specify the right
to treatment, but it was felt that too many lawsuits would be
started in an attempt to secure services that Pennsylvania facilities
were not yet equipped to supply. 170 This fear seems to be incon-
sistent with the current encouragement of voluntary admissions.
If we cannot effectively treat those who are already hospitalized,
how can we handle more?
It is suggested that the legislature reconsider this area of
judicial commitment and amend it to embody all of the procedures
and safeguards which these other states are including. If Pennsyl-
vania is to proceed for another 290 years without a substantive
revision of its mental health laws, it should have the benefit of
165. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(d) (Supp. IV, 1965).
166. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(e),(f) (Supp. IV, 1965).
167. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-356(f) (Supp. IV, 1965).
168. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-358(b) (Supp. IV, 1965).
169. GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, LAWs GOVERNING Hos-
PITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 157 (Report No. 61, 1966).
170. Camp, supra note 153.
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beginning with the best statute possible.
SEPARATION FROM THE FACILITY
Probably for historical reasons, hospitalization statutes deal
mostly with the procedural problems of getting the mental patient
into the hospital, and place less emphasis on provisions for release.
In the past, when mental hospitals were largely custodial institu-
tions, few patients were ever "cured," so that the vast majority of
those committed spent the remainder of their natural lives in the
institution. Recent developments, however, have operated to give
separation procedures added dimensions. Progress in methods of
treatment, especially since the introduction and effective use of
tranquilizers, has allowed many patients to improve or recover suf-
ficiently to resume their place in society. Crowded conditions in
mental facilities required realistic reappraisal and release of mar-
ginal patients who could be treated effectively without total in-
stitutionalization. The increased use of voluntary admission pro-
cedures as the best method of hospitalizing the mentally ill ab-
solutely requires free and uncomplicated release procedures.
It will be remembered that in those situations where entrance
procedures failed to measure up to the requirements of due process
of law, their proponents often rationalized that wrongful detentiori
was unlikely since there were adequate provisions for release avail-
able to any patient wrongfully committed. It will be seen that
those provisions for release which did exist were inadequate, and
certainly not effective enough to justify retention of constitu-
tionally doubtful admission procedures.
Administrative Release
The Mental Health Act of 1951 provided three types of admin-
istrative release. Under section 601,171 the trustees or superin-
tendent of any institution could discharge any patient if, in their
opinion, no harm would arise from their action. No patient could
be discharged unless notice had first been given to the Depart-
ment of Welfare. Certain categories of non-criminal patients could
not be discharged, among them: (1) A patient known to be homi-
cidal or otherwise dangerous to be at large, without examination
by and consent of the department, nor without a sufficient guaran-
tee by the person liable for his support and care that the safety of
the public or any individual would be safeguarded; (2) A patient
whose parent, guardian, or friend liable for his support opposed
his discharge, without notice to such person, and an opportunity for
them to state their reasons. Section 603172 provided that the De-
partment of Welfare could, in its discretion, order and compel the
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301 (1954) (Emphasis added.)
172. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1303 (1954).
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discharge from any institution any patient except those whose
commitment arose out of a criminal proceeding. Before issuing the
order, notice had to be given to the superintendent of the institu-
tion and to the person at whose instance the patient was detained,
and a reasonable opportunity given for such superintendent or per-
son to justify further detention of the patient. Finally, any pa-
tient who had been continuously absent with or without leave for a
twelve month period was deemed to be discharged automatically.
There are several difficulties encountered in these administra-
tive release provisions. The authority which is responsible for
hospitalization in the first place is not the one responsible for
discharge. The standards and policies used by a court in ordering
commitment are not the same as those required for retention in the
facility, which are independently established by the institution.
The patient may have been committed only because he might have
injured himself or others if allowed to remain at large. Nonethe-
less the institution could detain the patient on the ground that he
is in need of care and treatment, even though his propensity to
work injury has ceased. There is no attempt to correlate the stand-
ard for detention with the standard for release. Indeed under the
1951 Act, a third standard came into the picture when the pa-
tient's parent or guardian was allowed to oppose the discharge. 173
That a relative is opposed, for whatever reason, is not a sound
basis for further detention in a mental hospital.
To place authority in the Department of Welfare to order dis-
charge may not always be effective, since the final decisions then
rest with someone far removed from the factual situation involved.
This problem is particularly significant with respect to patients
in private institutions. Even though they are under the control of
the Department, it is less likely that an abuse of discharge pro-
cedure would come to the attention of the state authorities, and a
private facility which is motivated at least in part by the anticipa-
tion of profit might have difficulty maintaining an objective atti-
tude in considering the discharge of a patient.
The strongest reason for dissatisfaction with administrative
release procedures is that none of them can be initiated by the
patient. It may be that if he could bring his case to the attention
of the superintendent, subsequent examination would lead to his
discharge. In the absence of any guarantee of a periodic review of
his condition, the patient is left to plead with hospital personnel
for reexamination and reconsideration. Since mental hospitals
usually have a poor patient-psychiatrist ratio, and are otherwise
under-staffed, even that opportunity is unavailable.1 7 4  It is also
173. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301 (1954).
174. As of June 30, 1966, there were only 180 psychiatrists employed
by Pennsylvania's 18 State mental hospitals, which had an average daily
census of 34,920 patients in June, 1966. The resulting psychiatrist-patient
ratio is 1 to 194. (The State employs more than 180 psychiatrists, but
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obvious that the staff of a mental institution, professional and
non-professional alike, quickly becomes callous to repeated plain-
tive requests for release by the patients. In short, a patient who is
involuntarily hospitalized, without notice to him or a hearing where
he can protest beforehand, has no single effective means of raising
the question of his discharge short of petitioning for judicial re-
view, which is supposed to be a last resort. The severity of
this limitation becomes even more vivid when it is remembered
that an involuntary patient is committed for an indeterminate pe-
riod. Even a wrongfully convicted criminal cannot be confined
for more than the period of his sentence, and that is subject to
reconsideration under parole procedure.
The 1966 Act has administrative release provisions comparable
to the old Act. Section 418 directs itself to the "Duration of Ad-
mission or Commitment; in General." Any admission or commit-
ment of a person under the act shall be valid and authorize the
detention of such person only for the period specified in the section
under which he was admitted or committed, or, where authorized
for such a period as a court may specify in its order of commitment.
If no period is specified in a commitment, the person may be de-
tained until care or treatment is no longer necessary, whereupon
he shall be discharged, or otherwise dealt with in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. The Department may review any com-
many of these are part-time positions. The number 180 represents equiva-
lent full-time positions.) Of the 180 psychiatrists, however, 31 are super-
intendents or assistant superintendents of the hospitals who would be
preoccupied with administrative duties. Also included in the figure are
43 psychiatric residents who spend much of their time in training rather
than in patient care. Exclusion of these two classifications would leave
only 106 psychiatrists actually engaged in patient treatment.
In 1954, the American Psychiatric Association, in conjunction with the
Pennsylvania Mental Health Survey Committee established personnel
quotas for Pennsylvania's mental hospitals based on APA standards. A
revised quota has been established each succeeding year. As of June 30,
1966, the number of patient-care employees expressed as a percentage of
the optimum APA quota was as follows:









Greater personnel deficiencies are apparent when certain categories are
examined. Among the 88 full-time equivalent psychologists in the State
hospitals, only 24 were fully trained and held doctorate degrees. The term
"attendant" includes practical nurses, barbers, beauticians, domestics, jan-
itors, and food service workers, most of which are not employed in patient-
care services. DEP'T or PUBLIc WELFARE, COM. OF PA., REPORT ON PERSONNEL
OF STATE MENTAL INSTITUTIONS: 1966 (Oct. 4, 1966).
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mitment made under the Act (other than criminal) and the secre-
tary may order the discharge of any person so committed whenever
he finds that care or treatment in a facility is no longer neces-
sary.'
7 5
It appears that the question of discharge is still dependent
upon the medical status of the patient-his need for care or treat-
ment as subjectively determined by those persons responsible for
his treatment, and no attempt to correlate it to the criteria of
admission has been made. It does appear that the patient can now
be discharged over the objection or interference of persons liable
for his support, but in no other respect does the 1966 Act modify
release procedures.
Hidden in those sections of the Act pertaining to the various
admission procedures, however, is the specification that a commit-
tee of the professional staff of the facility review each commit-
ment annually. Such provisions exist in the voluntary admission,
voluntary commitment, and ex parte commitment sections. 176
Annual review at least guarantees to the patient that his condition
will be considered periodically, but that consideration is still only
one of the patient's medical status, and it is not available to pa-
tients committed via court order.
All of the inadequacies of current release procedures could
be remedied by the establishment of a Mental Health Review
Service. It should be a completely independent body, clearly and
inviolably immune from all governmental or private group pres-
sures. The members of the board should be appointed by the Gov-
ernor from lists submitted by the Department of Welfare, the as-
sociation of private licensed mental health facilities, and the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association. The Review Board should appoint a full
time executive director, preferably an attorney. The powers and
duties of the agency would be:
(1) to study and review the status of all patients receiving
care under the 1966 Act;
(2) to inform patients and those interested in his welfare
of his right to counsel, to have judicial hearing and re-
view, and to seek independent medical opinion;
(3) to review the status of a particular patient upon ap-
plication by or on behalf of the patient or on its own
motion;
(4) upon application for review, to appoint a commission
consisting of an attorney, a psychiatrist not associated
with any mental health facility, and a member of the
Review Service Board, which should hold an informal
hearing at the facility wherein the patient resides;
(5) upon hearing, to examine the procedure by which the
patient was admitted, to compare the criteria for the
175. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 420.
176. Mental Health Act of 1966, §§ 402, 403, 404.
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patient's admission to the criteria upon which retention
of the patient is sought, and make written recommen-
dations to the director of the facility for the disposition
of the patient, either that the patient continue under
care in his present status, that his status be modified,
or that he be released;
(6) if the director and/or the Department fail (s) to accept
the recommendation of the commission and the pa-
tient has been involuntarily hospitalized, to make cer-
tain that the patient is aware of his right to petition
for habeas corpus and to help facilitate the exercise of
that right.
The proposed establishment of a Mental Health Review Service
would remedy all of the shortcomings of the administrative release
procedures as they currently exist. The patient would be guaran-
teed review of his total situation, legal and medical, and the stand-
ards and policies under which he was admitted could be considered
along with those under which he could be released to ensure that
they are the same. Most important, the patient could raise the
question of his discharge and initiate procedures leading to his
release without being required to resort in all cases to judicial re-
view. The very existence of the Review Service would have a de-
sirable effect upon those public mental facilities which do not keep
a close enough check on patients who might be well enough to be
discharged, and upon private institutions where the profit mo-
tive might be the reason for continued detention. The desirability
of such an agency has been recognized and implemented in other
jurisdictions. In the District of Columbia a nine member Commis-
sion on Mental Health, appointed by the United States District
Court, inquires into the affairs of mentally ill persons and may
conduct examinations or hearings anywhere in their discretion.
77
A mental health information service is created by statute for each
judicial department of the supreme court in New York, providing
similar services for patients and their families. 78  It is recom-
mended that an independent agency such as the one suggested be
created by amendment to the 1966 Act.
Judicial Release
It has been seen that under none of the provisions of either
the 1951 or 1966 Acts has the person to be committed been guar-
anteed prior notice and a hearing before hospitalization. Thus the
patient is denied the primary safeguards guaranteed by the Con-
stitution for every deprivation of personal liberty. The harsh
effect of this denial could have been ameliorated by effective re-
lease procedures and an opportunity for the patient to secure pe-
riodic review of his status once he was in the hospital, but it is
evident that these intermediate safeguards are also unavailable to
177. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-352 (Supp. IV, 1965).
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the involuntary patient. The ultimate safeguard and chief remedy
of such a person therefore must be the writ of habeas corpus,
which stands as a constitutional bulwark against unreasonable
bodily restraint. Since there have been very few petitions for the
writ of habeas corpus by patients in Pennsylvania mental hos-
pitals, it might be wondered whether even this remedy has been
effective. 179 Upon analysis it is found that conflicting provisions
in the 1951 Act and the amendments thereto, coupled with judicial
interpretations of these provisions, have shrouded the procedures
for judicial release in hopeless confusion. Whether the 1966 Act
will clarify the process remains to be seen. In the interest of
clarity, the provisions relative to discharge by court order and the
writ of habeas corpus must be considered in their chronological
sequence.
A. Judicial Review other than Habeas Corpus
Section 604 of the 1951 Act was entitled "Discharge by order
of court."' 8 0  This section and its provisions existed entirely
apart from any section pertaining to habeas corpus. As originally
enacted, it provided that any court could order and compel the dis-
charge of any patient committed by that court to any institution
if, upon hearing, it appeared that such discharge was for the best
interest of the patient and not incompatible with public welfare
and safety.'8 ' At the same time, section 801(6) provided that the
patient had the "right to be released as soon as he is restored to
mental health and competent to manage his own affairs."'
' 2 It
should be noted that the petition for discharge had to be brought
in the same court which committed the patient. The standards for
discharge by the court were the "best interest" of the patient and
compatibility with public welfare and safety, thereby implying
that the patient did not have to be completely restored to mental
health and that a "police power" standard was contemplated. On
the other hand, section 801 (6) conditioned the right to release upon
restoration to mental health and added the irrelevant standard of
"competency to manage his own affairs." Section 604 was not an
automatic, but a limited ground for release. Section 801(6) was
automatic, unlimited, and unqualified. The question, then, was
which section controlled. In Commonwealth v. Jenkins,18 3 decided
in 1960, the petitioner was no longer mentally ill but had criminal
tendencies. The court recognized the problem when it said:
[U] pon subsequent recovery of mental health, (peti-
tioner) finds himself caught between two seemingly con-
178. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88.
179. Borden, supra note 129, at 203.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304 (1954).
181. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304(a) (1954) (Emphasis added.)
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(6) (1954).
183. 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Q. Sess. Phila. Co. 1960).
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flicting statutory commands. . . Since (petitioner) is not
mentally ill, he is entitled to discharge under 801(6), unless
604 is construed as a limitation on that right. We hold
... that 604 does not authorize further confinement.
184
rn 1963, section 604 was amended. 8 ' As it then read, any
patient could petition the court which committed him or the court
of common pleas of the county where he was detained for discharge
on the ground that his continued hospitalization was not warranted
by reason of mental illness. The petition had to be accompanied by
the affidavit of a physician stating that he had examined the pa-
tient and that he was of the opinion that the patient was not
mentally ill. The court then had to hold a hearing, and the bur-
den of proof as to mental illness rested upon those persons re-
sponsible for the patient's continued hospitalization. By the 1963
amendment to section 604 (1) the patient was no longer restricted
to filing the petition in the same court which committed him;
(2) the standard for discharge was revised to conform to that of
section 801 (6), i.e., restoration to mental health; and (3) the burden
of proof was shifted to the director. Accurately foreseeing the
problems a patient might have in securing an independent medi-
cal opinion, the legislature by the same amendment granted the
patient the right to request the commissioner of mental health to
arrange for examination by a physician not associated with a
state facility. Such a request could only be refused when made
within six months of commitment or sooner than one year after
a previous examination under that section.186 Section 604 of the
1951 Act, after the 1963 amendment, was a very desirable provision.
Those patients committed by court order could petition for dis-
charge without resorting to the intricacies of habeas corpus. It
was mandatory on the court to hold a hearing on the question,
and the patient did not have to bear the extremely difficult burden
of proof. Yet, after this struggle for an effective procedure, the
legislature did not see fit to incorporate it into the 1966 Act, which
consequently has no provision for judicial review other than
habeas corpus.
B. Habeas Corpus
The provisions of the 1951 Act were also confusing with respect
to habeas corpus. Strangely, the original version of the statute
provided for habeas corpus in two separate provisions. Section
351 provided that every commitment could be appealed by the writ
of habeas corpus, which could be sued out at any time by any
184. Id. at 420. Contra, Commonwealth v. Cook, 19 Beaver 4, aff'd,
390 Pa. 516, 135 A.2d 751 (1957).
185. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304 (Supp. 1965).
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(8) (Supp. 1965).
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person restrained or anyone acting on his behalf. 18 7 Under that
provision, the burden would have been on the relator to prove an
illegal detention. Section 802 also provided for the writ of habeas
corpus, on the grounds that the patient was unjustly deprived of
his liberty.88 The latter section further provided that the court
must issue a writ requiring the patient to be brought before the
court for a hearing, when the question of his mental illness
could be determined, and that the burden of proof rested upon
those responsible for his continued hospitalization.'8 9 For the pur-
poses of analysis, the two sections as originally enacted are more
easily compared as follows:
(1) Section 351: no specification of the grounds for appeal
under the writ.
Section 802: specified the ground of unjust deprivation
of liberty.
(2) Section 351: no requirement that the person be brought
before the court, or that a hearing be held, or that the
petition even need be considered by the judge.
Section 802: required consideration of the writ, that
a hearing be held, and that the patient be brought
into court.
(3) Section 351: not clear as to whether the patient's pres-
sent condition is to be considered, or just the legality
of the original detention.
Section 802: the patient's condition at the time of the
hearing is to be considered, and nothing is said about
the sufficiency of the original detention procedure.
(4) Section 351: the burden of proof is on the relator.
Section 802: the burden of proof is on the staff of the
facility.
When a writ of habeas corpus is sought by a prisoner who has
been incarcerated, the only question is the legality of the pro-
ceedings that resulted in his imprisonment. It is relatively easy
for a judge to consider a prisoner's petition, for two reasons. No
person is ever summarily jailed without notice to him or an op-
portunity for him to be heard. Such a person is allowed to con-
front his accusers, cross-examine them, and defend himself. Sub-
stantial records of the procedure surrounding this process are com-
piled, from the moment of initial arrest all the way through con-
viction and sentencing, and these records are on file in the court
wherein the adjudication took place. All that a judge must do,
then, is to obtain these records and examine them for possible
errors which would support a petition for habeas corpus. Secondly,
the only issue is the sufficiency of those proceedings, and the ex-
tent to which the prisoner has been rehabilitated is of no conse-
187. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1241 (1954).
188. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1482(a) (1954).
189. PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1482(b) (1954).
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quence. Therefore there is no reason for the judge to consider the
present circumstances of the prisoner.
We are dealing, however, with mental patients and not prison-
ers. It has already been noted that almost all civil commitments
occur without judicial proceedings, and in no case was the oppor-
tunity for notice or a hearing absolutely accorded to the person to
be committed. Therefore, there is no proceeding the legality of
which can be tested by a writ of habeas corpus. For the same
reason, there are no records which a judge can examine for error.
The only method left for a judge to determine whether a mentally
ill person should be discharged is to consider the patient's present
mental condition, of which there necessarily is no record, since it
exists only at a moment in time-the present. Logically then the
person must be brought before the court for presentation of evi-
dence and a decision.
Viewed in this light, section 802 of the 1951 Act was clearly a
better habeas corpus provision than section 351. But which sec-
tion controlled? Unfortunately it was held in 1963 in Common-
wealth v. Shovlin'9 0 that section 351 controlled, and the court ac-
cordingly dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without
a hearing. The choice of section 351 was lamented by Judge
Montgomery in his dissent when he noted that section 802 "spe-
cifically provides for a hearing on such a petition."'191 Later in
that same year, the legislature moved to amend the 1951 Act, ap-
parently recognizing the conflict between the two sections. The
only difficulty with their action was that they reached the wrong
result. The best provision, section 802, was repealed absolutely.
92
Section 351 was revised, and thereafter provided that petitions
for writs of habeas corpus were to be filed in accordance with
Pennsylvania's general habeas corpus statute.-' The latter statute
makes the issuance of the writ discretionary with the judge, and
if the writ does issue and a hearing is held, the relator does not
have to be present. 94 Thus the difficulties noted above reasserted
themselves. Since the judge had no record to examine, one might
wonder about the basis upon which a writ issued or was denied.
The present mental condition of the patient was never even con-
sidered by the court.
The supreme court further aggravated the plight of the mental
patient in Commonwealth ex rel Wolenski v. Shovlin.195 The
court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner,
saying that he had proceeded outside the statute by not first trying
190. 201 Pa. Super. 331, 191 A.2d 914 (1963).
191. Id. at 336, 191 A.2d at 917.
192. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1482 (Supp. 1965).
193. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1241 (Supp. 1965). The general habeas
corpus statute is found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1871-1907 (1954).
194. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1905 (1954).
195. 419 Pa. 35, 213 A.2d 327 (1965).
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for release under section 604 (discharge by order of court). Thus
a mental patient, who is indeed fortunate in being able to sur-
mount the heretofore noted obstacles that stand in the way of judi-
cial review, might be thwarted simply because he proceeded under
the "incorrect" statutory provision. The two procedures should
have been in the alternative.
In light of this historical analysis of the 1951 Act and its
amendments as they affected judicial release, the 1966 Act can be
more realistically appraised. As was previously noted, the 1966
Act provides no judicial discharge procedure other than habeas
corpus, but at the same time several of the desirable features of
old section 604 (discharge by order of court) have been carried
over and tacked onto the habeas corpus provisions in the form of
qualifications and provisos. Under the new Act, every person com-
mitted or detained in a facility or anyone acting in his behalf,
may at any time petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the peti-
tion must be filed in accordance with the general habeas corpus
act.196 The petition may be on either of two grounds: (1) The
insufficiency or illegality of the proceedings leading to such per-
son's commitment, or (2) although the commitment proceedings
were proper, such person's continued detention or hospitalization is
not warranted by reason of mental disability. 19 7 Where the peti-
tion is based upon the first ground, the new Act is silent as to who
bears the burden of proof. Presumably it rests upon the relator.
Where the petition is based upon the second ground (1) it must
be accompanied by the affidavit of a physician stating that he has
examined the person and is of the opinion that such person is
not mentally disabled or that such mental disability does not re-
quire care or treatment in a facility, and (2) the burden of proof
rests upon the director responsible for the person's continued de-
tention.
The habeas corpus provisions of the 1966 Act again seem to go
only half-way toward meeting the peculiar requirements of a
mental patient seeking freedom. Although the second important
ground for the writ (mental condition) is recognized and set forth,
the need for a doctor's certificate is recognized and required, and
the burden of proof is rightfully shifted, the sine qua non of the
whole process-a hearing-is not made mandatory. Unless there is
a hearing, the burden of proof cannot shift, since the hearing is
the only place where the evidence of those responsible for con-
tinued detention is brought to the court's attention. Absent the
hearing, when the ground for the petition is restoration of mental
health, the only evidence upon which a decision as to the issuance
of the writ can be made is the petition itself with the attached
doctor's affidavit. Unless the petition is self-sustaining and makes
196. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 426(a).
197. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 426(b) (Emphasis added.)
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out a case for the petitioner, a hearing is not mandatory., Since
mental patients are not provided with counsel if they cannot af-
ford one, their self-drawn petitions are very likely not to be self-
sustaining. This disadvantage, coupled with the fact that a court
would probably hesitate to process a request for release in the face
of the detaining hospital's judgment that the patient is not ready
for discharge, seems to "stack the deck" very heavily against the
petitioner. All of these restrictions might be justifiable in the or-
dinary criminal situation, but it must always be kept in mind that
habeas corpus is the objecting mental patient's only hope. As has
been pointed out, procedures under which he is committed do not
satisfy the requirements of due process. Release procedures are
inadequate. Somewhere along the way the mental patient should
be given some consideration, and now it seems that habeas corpus,
his last resort, will not meet his needs either. In this respect the
1951 Act, before it was amended, was clearly a better provision.
There a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought a mandatory
hearing, and it was imperative that the petitioner be brought into
court. The 1966 Act should be amended to include these two re-
quirements.
RIGHTS OF HOSPITALIZED PATIENTS
In recent times, due to advances in treatment, persons who
are mentally disabled have come to be regarded as simply "sick"
in the same sense as a physical illness. Accordingly, the notion
that they are incapable of comprehending or exercising their per-
sonal rights has largely disappeared. Patients while hospitalized
should be protected in the enjoyment of their personal rights to
the extent consistent with required treatment and necessary deten-
tion. By and large the 1966 Act recognizes and respects these
rights. Under section 423 of the Act 99 a patient is guaranteed the
personal right to religious freedom; to communicate and be alone
with his counsel or representative of the department; to send sealed
communications to the director, any member of his family, the
department, the court (if any) which committed him, and the
Governor; to be employed at a useful occupation if the facility can
furnish one; to sell the products of his skill and labor; to be fur-
nished writing materials and reasonable opportunity for communi-
cating with any person outside of the facility; and to have such
communications stamped and mailed. The patient also has the
right to be released as soon as care or treatment in a facility is no
longer necessary. This is a much more valid standard than its
counterpart under the 1951 Act, which gave the patient the right
"to be released as soon as he is restored to mental health and
198. Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Shovlin, 205 Pa. Super. 371, 374,
208 A.2d 924, 926 (1965).
199. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 423.
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competent to manage his own affairs. °200 The new Act recognizes
that "mental health" is a relative concept, and that many patients
may improve to the point where they can be effectively cared for
at home, or by some system of outpatient care. The right to re-
quest examination of his mental condition by a physician not as-
sociated with the department is also guaranteed the patient. This
right is crucial since a doctor's affidavit certifying present mental
health must accompany any petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The department may refuse to grant such a request only when
made sooner than six months after commitment or sooner than one
year after a previously requested examination.
One of the rights secured to the patient under the 1951 Act has
been removed under the 1966 Act. Section 801(7) of the 1951
Act 201 gave all patients the right to be visited and examined at all
reasonable hours by any medical or osteopathic physician desig-
nated by him or by any member of his family or "near friend."
With the consent of the patient and of the superintendent, such a
practitioner could attend the patient for all maladies other than
mental illness in the same manner as if the patient were in his own
home. The foregoing provision was an absolute right. But under
the 1966 Act it has become a privilege, if not a concession. The
director of the facility, in his discretion, may allow any patient to
be treated or counseled by his family or personal psychiatrist,
physician, or other medical practitioner, psychologist, social worker,
or other person.2 0 2 This transformation of the provision from a
right to a privilege is extremely detrimental to the patient. Grant-
ed that such medical treatment must be limited to reasonable
hours and made subject to supervision of the staff of the facility,
but patients should never be denied a reasonable opportunity for
visitation by a personal physician. Contact with persons outside
of the facility is beneficial to the patient, and may also be his only
opportunity to air a grievance or begin procedures leading to his
release if he is being held against his will. If this right must be
made discretionary with the director, it is hoped a review service
will be established to oversee the exercise of such discretion.
Any person hospitalized is entitled to the utmost protection of
his rights, because he is a citizen first and a mental patient second.
This is especially true of those admitted as voluntary patients, yet
the rights outlined above appear to have been drafted primarily to
protect involuntary patients. If voluntary admission is to be en-
couraged and ultimately successful, those admitted as voluntary
patients should not be deprived of any of the rights enjoyed by the
general populace. Such patients should be guaranteed the right to
vote, to hold any licenses which they have acquired, and to be
assured that their civil service ranking or other job rating will not
200. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(6) (1954).
201. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(7) (Supp. 1965).
202. Mental Health Act of 1966, § 417(b).
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be prejudiced. Protection of these and similar rights should be
spelled out in the 1966 Act as it applies to voluntary patients to
the extent compatible with treatment.
Another right which should be specified in the Act is the pa-
tient's right to have counsel. The Supreme Court has precipitated
a wholesale expansion of the right to assigned counsel in the
criminal process, but as yet has not considered the question as it
affects civil commitment. Whether the right of a person being
committed to have assigned counsel is extended by statute or judi-
cial decision is of no importance. 03 Since the Supreme Court has
not spoken on the subject, it is recommended that the legislature
voluntarily and specifically extend this right by amendment to the
new Act. Even if the commitment is not contested, an attorney
can submit useful information to the court such as social back-
ground, ability to pay the costs, and other collateral matters
which would enable the court to make a fully informed judgment.
That a person to be committed refuses to cooperate with his coun-
sel should not preclude the assistance of an attorney, since it is
doubtful that a person thought to be mentally ill could make an
intelligent waiver. In such a case, an attorney should be appointed
as an amicus to investigate and bring relevant matters to the court's
attention.
The Patient's Right to Treatment
Throughout the 1966 Mental Health Act the language refers
to the "care or treatment" of the patient. That these words are
always used in the disjunctive is deliberate, and not mere hap-
penstance. If the phrase said "care and treatment" it would
amount to a guarantee that mental patients would be actively
treated for their mental disability. Is it stretching the rules of
interpretation too far to conclude that if the statute is applicable
to a person who is in need of mental treatment, that individual is
entitled to receive that treatment for which he is being detained,
especially if held against his will? It would seem that if the state
restrains a person because of his mental disability, there should
arise a corresponding duty to provide the person with active treat-
ment, whether or not it will be successful. The writer was in-
formed that the draftsmen of the new act wanted to specify the
203. In People v. Breese, 34 Il.2d 61, 213 N.E.2d 500 (1966), the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that even though commitment proceedings
are civil in nature, a defendant must be accorded the essential protections
available in a criminal trial. The Court of Appeals of New York, in People
ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256. 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966), ruled
that indigent mental patients committed to an institution are entitled to
assignment of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding in which they try to
establish their sanity and procure their release. This extension of the
right to counsel to mental patients goes much further than the N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 88 which provides only for the discretionary appointment
of counsel by the court in such cases.
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right to treatment, but it was felt that the Commonwealth would
be exposing itself to innumerable lawsuits for services that its
facilities could not now provide. 204 If that justification is valid,
then the question might arise as to how the 1966 Act can justify
the expenditure of millions of dollars to establish new facilities at
the county level throughout the State without also appropriating
funds to provide better facilities for treatment at present institu-
tions which are so sorely lacking that we cannot guarantee existing
mental patients the treatment they deserve. Another inconsistency
is the solicitation and encouragement of voluntary admissions when
involuntary patients may not be getting the services they need.
As the law now reads, however, only "care or treatment" is man-
dated, thereby allowing merely custodial facilities to operate com-
fortably within the provisions of the Act. The worst element of
this problem is that there is no statutory or judicial recourse by
which a patient can exact the active treatment to which he is
entitled.
The United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
recently considered this problem, and handed down a decision which
may well indicate the beginning of the end of purely custodial
care for the mentally disabled. In Rouse v. Cameron,205 the peti-
tioner had attacked his confinement in a mental hospital by a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. Describing involuntary confine-
ment of a mental patient without treatment as "shocking," the
court held that the relator had a right to treatment and remanded
to ascertain whether adequate treatment was being given. The
case was governed by the District of Columbia Hospitalization
of the Mentally Ill Act which provides:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental
illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medi-
cal and psychiatric care and treatment. The administrator
of each public hospital shall keep records detailing all
medical and psychiatric care and treatment received by a
person hospitalized for a mental illness .... 206
It is seen that even with an explicit statutory guarantee, there
arose the problem of a lack of treatment. What would the result
be if, as in Pennsylvania, there had been no such authority? The
court in Rouse might have given an indication when it said: "Be-
cause we hold that the right to treatment provision applies to
appellant, we need not resolve the serious constitutional questions
that Congress avoided by prescribing this right."20 7 It was fur-
ther observed that:
According to leading experts 'psychiatric care and
204. Camp, supra note 153.
205. No. 19863, U.S. Ct. App. for the Dist. of Col., October 10, 1966.
206. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (Supp. V, 1966).
207. No. 19863, U.S. Ct. App. for the Dist. of Col., [at p. 6] October
10, 1966 (Emphasis added.)
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treatment' includes not only the contacts with psychia-
trists but also activities and contacts with the hospital staff
designed to cure or improve the patient. The hospital need
not show that the treatment will cure or improve him but
only that there is a bona fide effort to do so. . . . It may
not be assumed that confinement in a hospital is bene-
ficial 'environmental therapy' for all.
20
The court went on to observe that continuing failure to pro-
vide suitable and adequate treatment cannot be justified by lack
of staff or facilities. Since Pennsylvania probably does not yet
have the staff or facilities to provide comprehensive treatment
for every mental patient,209 it would probably be futile to suggest
that the 1966 Act be amended to specify as broad a right to treat-
ment as that set out in the D. C. Code. But it is not too much to
ask that a provision similar to the one recommended by the Draft
Act be enacted as a step in the right direction. The Draft Act
provides:
Every patient shall be entitled to humane care and
treatment and, to the extent that facilities, equipment, and
personnel are available, to medical care and treatment in
accordance with the highest standards accepted in medical
practice.
210
The legislature should reexamine the alternatives. The choice is
between better care and treatment for fewer mental patients, and
skimpy or barely adequate treatment for the great numbers at-
tracted to the county centers established by the 1966 Act. By en-
acting a statutory provision such as the one suggested and accom-
panying it with a resolution to channel more funds into the care
of mental patients, Pennsylvania could go a long way toward a
truly progressive mental health program.
CONCLUSION
The concept of hospitalization of the mentally disabled is
plagued with two contradictory motivations which are equally
worthy: the desire to obtain treatment for persons who are sick,
and the urge to prevent unjust deprivations of liberty. The first
is the concern of the medical profession and the second a legal
matter. The object of a mental health statute is to resolve these
apparently incompatible considerations by designing a legislative
framework that will give equal protection to each of these inter-
ests.
It must be recognized, however, that this reconciliation of
conflicting interests finds expression through the use of a statute-
a legal model. It is cast in a legal mold, promulgated by a legisla-
208. Id. at 8.
209. See note 174 supra.
210. Draft Act § 19 (Emphasis added.)
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ture, and interpreted and enforced in the courts. Once the legal
model is chosen as the mechanism for the disposition of the men-
tally ill, the substantive and procedural safeguards embodied in
the concept of due process of law are applicable. Because of a
generally apathetic attitude and the prevailing feeling that any-
thing we do for the mentally ill can only be in their best interest,
some of these constitutional requirements can easily be overlooked.
It is submitted that such is the case with the Pennsylvania Men-
tal Health-Mental Retardation Act of 1966. The Act represents a
genuine effort to provide a comprehensive and effective scheme for
the hospitalization of the mentally ill. It is suggested that con-
sideration of and action upon the recommendations heretofore
made in this Comment could make the 1966 Act a complete and
progressive example of model legislation to which Pennsylvania
could point with pride.
Effective methods of combatting the problem of mental ill-
ness can only be achieved through the mutual effort and under-
standing of physicians, attorneys, and legislators. Medical science
is doing its part. It is now up to the legislature and the legal
profession to assume their respective responsibilities so that the
law can remain responsive to the needs of the ever-increasing
number of mentally disabled people in need of care and treatment.
F. MuRRAY BRYAN
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